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HAVING ONE'S PROPERTY AND EATING IT TOO: 
WHEN THE ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST 
BECOMES A NUISANCE 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
F. Stephen Knippenbergt 
INTRODUCTION 
That the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter the "Code" or 
"U. C. C."), at least as originally conceived, 1 was an extraordinary ac-
complishment, perhaps the most successful endeavor of its kind, is 
beyond cavil.2 But the crowning achievement was saved for the last-
© 2006 Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg. Individuals and 
nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any 
format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the 
author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision 
and copyright notice. 
* Dean and Mitchell Franklin Professor of Private and Commercial Law, Tulane 
University Law School. 
t Floyd and Martha Norris Chair and Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma 
College of Law. 
1 Originally published in the early 1950s, the Uniform Commercial Code has 
been periodically updated, including, over the past fifteen years, the substantial revi-
sion of virtually every article of the Code. Some commentators have questioned 
whether these revisions have eroded the Code's initial refinement, simplicity, and bal-
ance. (Put another way, whether the Code has become less inspirational and more 
prescriptive.) For further discussion of this difference in drafting style, see Lawrence 
Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the 
Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 7 4 AM. BANKR. 
LJ. 173, 204-06 (2000). 
2 Professors White and Summers refer to the U.C.C. project as "(t]he most spec-
tacular success story in the history of American law." Fred H. Miller, The Uniform 
Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43 MERCER L. RF.v. 799, 808 (1992) (cit-
ing jAMEs J. WHITE & RoBERT S. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL Coo£ 3 (3d ed. 
1988)). The Article is, according to one scholar, "the crowning achievement of the 
UCC project, and perhaps the entire uniform law enterprise." Edward]. Janger, Pre-
dicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 
83 IowA L. RF.v. 569, 571 (1998); see also Edward Rubin, Efficiency, ~quity and the Pro-
posed Revisions of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REv. 551, 557 (1991) (noting that for 
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Article 9. Powerful, creative, comprehensive yet elegant,3 Article 9 is 
generally regarded as the most innovative of the Code's articles. Pro-
ceeding from the assumption that secured credit is a good thing-
perhaps the best thing-Article 9 would be the means to facilitate se-
cured lending.4 This would be accomplished by making secured lend-
ing simple, cheap, and, well, secure.5 
Secured credit might be made simple, cheap, and certain 
through a variety of expedients, from skeletal, idiot-proof financing 
statements with little potential for drafting error, to bright-line rules 
for creating and perfecting the security interest. What "facilitates" se-
cured credit more than any of those, however, is an idea that under-
lies the whole regime of secured credit-that is, the reigning 
conceptualization of the security interest as "property." Because the 
security interest has found its way into that particular and historically 
hallowed legal category, Article 9's secured parties are figures of privi-
commercial law scholars of their generation, the greatest conceptual achievement in 
the field was Article 9). Even the reporters for Revised Article 9 displayed appropriate 
reverence in tinkering with what they described as perhaps the most successful statute 
ever conceived. Steven Harris & Charles Mooney, A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2021 (1994). Doubtless, 
the most stunning achievement of Article 9 is the elimination of the bewildering array 
of pre-Code security devices (the chattel mortgage, pledge, conditional sale, and so 
forth) together with the equally bewildering array of rules that governed them. 
3 Although the principle draftsperson of Article 9 was Grant Gilmore, this style 
of drafting is most commonly associated with Karl Llewellyn, primary architect of the 
Code, and, in both legislative drafting and judging, has been referred to as the Grand 
Style or Grand Tradition. See generally Karl Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the 
Grand Tradition, 9 U. CHI. L. ScH. REc. 6 (1960), reprinted injuRISPRUDENCE 215 (1962) 
(discussing the hallmarks of this style and extolling its virtues). 
4 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the invention of a dizzying 
array of disparate security devices, each governing a particular pattern of personal 
property financing, and each boasting its own terminology, limitations, rules of prior-
ity, etc. By the late 1940s, the law of chattel security was decidedly nonuniform and 
excruciatingly complex. The seminal treatment of pre-Code security devices can be 
found in 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURJTY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, l-286 ( 1965). 
It was against this backdrop that the primary drafters of Article 9, Gilmore and Allison 
Dunham, undertook to establish a unified'statute covering all forms of personal prop-
erty financing transactions, imposing uniformity, order, and predictability. See id. 
1-400. 
5 See pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972) ("The aim of this Article is to pro-
vide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day 
secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater 
certainty."). 
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lege among all creditors, enjoying a pervasive "property priority" 
under state law and even in bankruptcy.6 
Of course, if one group of creditors is to be privileged, another 
must necessarily be deprived-these are principally unsecured credi-
tors who cannot reach assets encumbered by security interests to sat-
isfY their claims, and, again, irrespective of whether they assert those 
claims in or out of bankruptcy. The descriptive and functional antith-
esis of secured creditors, unsecured creditors own no interest cogniza-
ble as property; their claims are solely in personam. For that reason, 
the unsecured creditor withers before the ownership interest of the 
Article 9 secured party, and it makes not a whit of difference how the 
unsecured claim was acquired (i.e., whether by consent or as redress 
for an i~ury committed by the debtor). It is difficult to imagine a set 
of circumstances better calculated to precipitate debate, and so it has. 
The property priority of Article 9 has been challenged as inefficient by 
some,7 inequitable by others,8 and all to no avail.9 The impact of de-
6 As the U.C.C. has been adopted in one version or another in every state, state 
law distribution rules refer, in fact, to priority rules. Those govern disputes arising 
between unsecured creditors and lien creditors (who became secured the hard way) 
and Article 9 secured parties. The long and the short of it is, where secured parties 
have perfected their security interests, they trump the lien creditors. U.C.C. § 9-
317(a)(2) (2006) [all references to the U.C.C. are, unless otherwise indicated, to the 
most recent version of the U.C.C., which was published in 2006]. In bankruptcy, a 
trustee deploying the power of a hypothetical lien creditor is likewise subordinate to 
the perfected security interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000). The treatment af-
forded secured claims in bankruptcy has always been a matter of controversy. See 
generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valua-
tions, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63 (1991) (arguing that valuation theories developed by bank-
ruptcy courts are neither objective nor subjective but instead are subjunctive). 
7 We refer here, of course, to the extensive body of literature on the distributive 
consequences of secured credit consequences, that is, for unsecured creditors. Much 
of that discourse-the so-called puzzle literature-was devoted to the question 
whether secured credit was efficient. In the 1970s, prominent legal scholars began to 
question fundamental assumptions upon which secured credit as an institution rests, 
such as the conventional thinking that secured credit expands credit markets and 
makes more credit available. Early sightings are in the work of Thomas Jackson and 
Anthony Kronman. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fi-
nancing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143 (1979). That work proposed 
that the justification for secured credit was to be found in the net gain realized from 
reduced monitoring costs, not in some mythical net gain in the form of an increase in 
high risk loans that, but for secured credit, would not be made at all. Id. at 1153. 
Above all, Jackson and Kronman had exposed a curiosity-the conventional rationale 
for secured credit could not explain the existence of what appeared to be an ineffi-
cient institution. Id. at 1158-61. The explicit declaration of secured credit to be a 
puzzle, together with the challenge to solve it, was issued thereafter by Professor Alan 
Schwartz. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Cur-
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daring the security interest to be property does not, however, end at 
the level of discreet individual priority disputes. 
The property priority granted a secured claimant, coupled with 
expansion in the forms of collateral amenable to capture under Arti-
cle 9 ushered in by the 1998 revision, 10 create the opportunity to 
rent Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1981). There followed a torrent of puzzle articles. 
See, e.g., James J. White, J<..Jficiency justifications for Persvnal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. 
REv. 473 (1984). The efficiency debate is "efficiently" summarized in Jay L. West-
brook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEx. L. REv. 795, 831-43 (2004). 
8 In the wake of the failure of the law and economics literature to provide a 
solution to the puzzle of secured credit, only the "folk theory" (the conventional pre-
mise that secured credit made credit easier to be had) was left standing. Lawrence 
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, 77te Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force: 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 
2234, 2257 (1997). How secured credit can exist if it is inefficient is irrelevant to the 
present Article-it does. However, its attendant costs to unsecured creditors, and 
justifying secured credit on a normative basis, are of central concern. See also id. at 
2258 ("(F]olk theory does not offer a normative justification at all."). 
Another group of scholars seem to have recognized this issue, pointing out the 
harmful effects worked on some classes of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy owing to 
the priorty of secured creditors. The group, led in its early incarnation by Professor 
Lynn LoPucki, was branded "Sympathetic Legal Studies" by Harris and Mooney, supra 
note 2, at 2045, or the shorthand, if unflattering, "Syrups." The label is likely unmer-
ited in that others have offered proper law-and-economics efficiency explanations for 
the same sort of adjustments to priority rules proposed by the Symps. See, e.g., Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE 
LJ. 857, 913-21 (1996). On the other hand, whereas the worst the finance literature 
has to say about secured credit is that it is, or might be, inefficient, LoPucki declares it 
"blight." See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 
1914 n.104 (1994). 
In any event, it is reasonably accurate to say that, on the Symp view, some un-
secured creditors are victims of secured credit and the priority given secured creditors 
in bankruptcy. !d. at 1896-1902. Briefly, Professor LoPucki submits that secured 
credit enables the debtor and its secured creditors to enjoy a kind of subsidy at the 
expense of an array of unsecured creditors. !d. at 1920-21. Unsecured creditors, of 
course, are not privy to the bargain between the debtors and the secured party that 
generates the subsidy, either because they did not transact voluntarily with the debtor, 
or because they are too uninformed and unsophisticated to recognize that it is being 
imposed on them. Id. at 1924-31. 
9 StJ infra note 10. 
10 Revised Article 9 became available for enactment by the states in 1999, with a 
delayed effective date of July 1, 2001. U.C.C. § 9-701 (2006). In its final form, it 
represented a complete victory for the conveyancing model of security by making it 
easier than ever before to create and perfect security interests in virtually anything 
and everything with accompanying changes in the priority rules that offer even 
stronger protection for the security interest against other claimants. See generally Ju-
lian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a Little Too Greedy?, 104 CoM. LJ. 241, 250 
(1999) (expressing concern that, collectively, the new provisions on scope, filing and 
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render the interests of unsecured creditors as a group worthless from 
the get-go through so-called 'judgment-proofing." Judgment-proof-
ing is a simple matter of the debtor incurring debt secured under the 
terms of an "all-assets" financing statement in an amount that is, or 
more likely becomes, in excess of the liquidation value of its assets-
and often foreseeably so. In this, security unchecked may impose a 
threat to the entire liability system.11 That result, however, does not 
have to flow from the prevailing understanding of security as property. 
It is our contention that if the security interest is property, then se-
cured credit deployed as a judgment-proofing scheme is a misuse of 
property. As in all matters of misuse, the law should supply a remedy. 
The remedy in the case of secured credit, however, has not been obvi-
ous, perhaps because those who have sought such a remedy have al-
ways done so by challenging the basic precepts of the property-based 
conception of security. A more fruitful approach, we believe, is to 
indulge the property metaphor on its own terms and then find a solu-
tion within the entailments that naturally flow from the metaphor. 
The tort of nuisance has long safeguarded the quiet enjoyment of 
landowners from disturbance in the form of unwelcome, harmful ac-
tivity conducted on neighboring property. That is to say, the consider-
able freedom of use that attends private land ownership is not without 
boundaries, and those boundaries are drawn somewhere at the edges 
of a neighbor's quiet enjoyment. With property rights come property 
responsibilities, and we would submit that it is analytically inconsequen-
tial whether those rights are real or personal, corporeal or 
incorporeal. 
Bewildering it is that a culture long intolerant of a nuisance that 
threatens the quiet enjoyment of land should be so at ease with an 
equally, if not more, noxious nuisance created by a personal property 
interest-namely, the denigration of the rights of unsecured creditors 
through the misuse of security. There is no currently recognized tort 
of nuisance to regulate the unreasonable, even reprehensible, use of 
priority could encourage preemptive filings designed to judgment-proof enterprises 
fearing tort liabilities or other unsecured claims). 
11 This is a major premise of Professor LoPucki's article, Lynn M. Lopucki, The 
Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 14-19 (1996). The liability system, as LoPucki de-
scribes it, centers around the satisfied judgment. Id. at 14. With the value of an insol-
vent debtor's assets conveyed away to the secured creditor, nothing remains for 
general creditors, either in or out of bankruptcy, rendering the basic component of 
the liability system worthless. Id. Professor LoPucki's theses quickly became the ob-
ject of scholarly attention expressed in a series of replies and rejoinders in the litera-
ture. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 
STAN. L. REv. 1 (l999);jamesJ. White, Corporate judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn 
LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE LJ. 1363 (1998). 
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secured credit. But that is hardly to say that secured credit cannot be 
deployed after a fashion prejudicial to neighboring interests in a 
credit community-in other words, after a fashion that is eerily remi-
niscent of a private nuisance. This suggests that perhaps the time has 
come to "discover" a tort that redresses that wrong in the same fashion 
as the ancient tort of private nuisance responds to unreasonable ex-
cesses by landowners. 
In this Article, therefore, we maintain that secured credit, when 
perverted to accomplish a de facto judgment-proofing scheme, is a 
nuisance, and a nuisance appropriately "abated" through the existing 
and well-accepted principles of subordination. To establish this pro-
position, in Part I we discuss the security interest as a member of the 
legal category "property," a conception of security emphatically em-
braced and reinforced on revision of Article 9. In addition, we try to 
articulate why the understanding of security as property has been so 
persistent and difficult to uproot. 
In Part II, we examine and evaluate the implications of inclusion 
of the security interest in the conceptual category of property with ref-
erence to insights into categorization that have emerged from recent 
work in cognitive linguistics. Much of what we do in law is about cate-
gorizing, such that these insights into human conceptual systems shed 
new light on the development of law, and thereby offer the opportu-
nity to consider the transformation of legal doctrine from a fresh 
perspective. 
Having accepted (without necessarily agreeing with) the notion 
of the security interest as entailing a conveyance of property, and also 
explained the conceptual consequences that flow from that category, 
in Part III we turn to an excursus into the law of nuisance as a corol-
lary of the legal category "property." Then, in Part IV, we conflate the 
discussion, making the case that nuisance doctrine offers a workable 
and defensible rubric to ferret out and condemn the use of security as 
a device for judgment-proofing. Lastly, in Part V, we propose what we 
believe to be the remedial response most neatly tailored to abate the 
"nuisance," that being full or partial subordination of the secured 
claim. 
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I. THE SECURI'IY INTEREST AS A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL 
CATEGORY PROPER'IY 
A. The Good Ship "Conceptual Alternatives" Has Sailed . 
379 
The security interest, we are instructed, owes its existence to a 
security agreement that "creates or provides for it,"12 suggesting, it 
would seem, that the concepts by which security is understood are 
mainly those same legal concepts that structure the law of contracts. 13 
In fact, however, there is fundamentally very little about security, as we 
have come to regard it, that depends on conceptual structures other 
than those that derive from property law. The evidence is everywhere, 
and the fact that security is about property, plain and simple, is frankly 
granted.14 It is a matter on which there is nearly universal accord, 
albeit not universally cheerful accord. 15 
12 U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (73) (2006). This aspect of the definition of "security agree-
ment" was also found in the 1972 version of the statute. See pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-
105(l)(l) (1972). 
13 Of course, the security agreement is in many regards just that-an agreement. 
U.C.C. § 9-203 contains statute of frauds and consideration (value given) require-
ments. But the security agreement in its most significant sense is understood as some-
thing of a deed. The controversial features of Article 9 (namely priorities and 
consequent implications for unsecured creditors) are a product of the property con-
cepts and its attendants, most notably, the imperative nemo dat. In this singular re-
gard, the security agreement is a conveyancing document. For the most part, the role 
of contract doctrine is limited to defining the relationship of the debtor and secured 
creditor. See generally F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future Nonadvance Obligations: Prefer-
ences Lost in Metaphor, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1537, 1571-80 (1994) (offering an account of 
the security agreement as contract and the metaphors that structure the contract 
relationship). . 
14 References in the literature which take as a given that security is property are 
common. See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bank-
ruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27, 59 
(1991) (referring to the secured creditor as a co-owner of the collateral with the 
debtor). In The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the 
Relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L. REv. 973 
(1983), Professor James Rogers states, "The notion that the secured creditor's reme-
dial right is a 'property' right may derive much of its intuitive force from the percep-
tion of the mortgage on Blackacre as the paradigm of secured financing." I d. at 992 
n. 74. The idea that the creation of a security interest is a conveyance is thus largely 
unquestioned and deeply entrenched in doctrine. But the idea of the security inter-
est as property first becomes an express policy justification for secured credit at the 
hands of Harris and Mooney. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2024-25, 
2047-66. 
15 Professor LoPucki, for example, is not convinced security is property (or, per-
haps, that it should be) in every way. Rather, he regards that position to be only a 
"theory" (and a bad one, he believes) by which security has come to be understood 
and justified. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1947-48, 1952-54; see also Carl S. Bjerre, 
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There have been sensible challenges to the conveyance model of 
security, 16 but they have largely fallen on deaf ears as far as the 
lawmakers are concerned.17 Article 9 clings relentlessly to this philo-
sophical supposition, more so than ever in the revision, and efforts to 
discredit or dislodge it have, in a word, failed. Rather than flail away 
further at the hegemony of the property-based understanding of se-
curity, we think at this stage it is more productive to inquire why it has 
emerged as hegemonous. Unquestionably, there are many reasons, 
but we posit three that are not only plausible, but we believe also re-
vealing in determining where we go from here. 
First (and this has nothing directly to do with the property 
model) is the metaphysics of objectivism, discussed more fully be-
low, 18 but consisting essentially of a set of epistemological convictions 
that hold that the world of experience is a world ordered without re-
gard to human conceptual systems. On the objectivist account, 
things, phenomena, and events stand in implicit and largely static as-
sociation, possess innate characteristics, and occupy naturally occur-
ring categories. Objectivist assumptions pervade nearly every 
intellectual endeavor,19 and in law find expression as "forrnalism,"20 
the notion of positive legal rules capable of producing results with the 
reassuring predictability of a mathematical postulate. From this 
Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 305, 349 n.178 (1999) (discussing critiques of the security-as-property 
metaphor); Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: An Essay in Reply, Re-
prisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REv. 1967, 1972 n.22 (1994) ("The notion that the crea-
tion of a security interest is a transfer of property is deeply rooted in doctrine and is 
clearly the dominant conceptualization of security."). 
16 The most notable, perhaps, being the Warren "carve-out" proposal, which one 
of the authors had involvement in drafting. See Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the 
Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1466 
(1997); Elizabeth Warren, An Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 CoNsUMER 
FIN. L.Q. REP. 323 (1997). 
1 7 Professor Charles Mooney, one of the co-reporters for the Article 9 revision 
process, described the reaction to the carve-out proposal at the Drafting Committee 
as having "died for lack of a first." See LYNN M. LoPucKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SE-
CURED CREDIT 659 (5th ed. 2006). 
18 See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
19 This is a philosophical heritage traceable to Kant and Descartes. See generally 
JoNATHAN BENNETT, KANT's ANALYI1C 130 (1966) (stating that for Kant, "self-con-
sciousness is possible only to a being who has experience of an objective realm"); 
RENE DESCARTES, RULES FOR THE DIREGriON OF THE MIND (1628), reprinted in J THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 9, 9-76 Qohn Cottingham et aJ. trans., 1985) 
(discussing twenty-one rules by which problems are simplified through intuition and 
deduction). Not even mathematics escapes objectivist postulates. See GEORGE LAKoFF, 
WoMEN, FIRE, AND DANGERous THINGS 368-69 (1987). 
20 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
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fiercely rational orientation, propositional answers are derived that 
promise certainty in a manner that alternative imaginative and meta-
phoric structures of thought on their face do not.21 Propositional an-
swers, no less an appealing commodity in legal reasoning than in any 
other endeavor, are doubtless especially attractive in the context of 
the law governing banks, finance companies, merchants, and their 
lawyers. The superimposition of syllogistic reasoning on what may in 
fact be largely metaphoric reasoning processes, as we shall discuss, cre-
ates an arguably false but nonetheless comforting sense of 
determinacy. 
Second (and this is directly relevant to the conveyance theory of 
security), to model security on property concepts invokes a powerful 
set of real and emotive associations unique to private property owner-
ship, and particularly ownership of land. Early in the history of the 
Republic, good citizenship and a host of other highly revered virtues 
were closely associated with the ownership of land.22 Beyond this 
(and far beyond this), property ownership is closely bound with no-
tions of liberty: "Property was important for the exercise of liberty, 
and liberty required the free exercise of property rights .... Without 
security [protection), property lost its value."23 
Finally, on a related but individual level, the dimensions of the 
concept of property-the most salient of which is "boundedness"-
were seen as assuring personal autonomy, privacy, and "freedom from 
the collective."24 The boundary image, central to traditional concep-
21 See infra text accompanying notes 39-43. 
22 See Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary 
America, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 467, 474-76 (1976) (discussing Jefferson's notions about 
land ownership, independent labor, and politics). In the mid-eighteenth century, 
every American colony, save one, limited the suffrage to those who owned land. Rob-
ert]. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 
337 (1989). There was popular consensus that there was no real independence with-
out private property ownership. I d. Chief among the concerns associated with creat-
ing a new government was protection of private property. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, 
Boundaries and the Bounded Self, in LAw AND THE ORDER OF CuLTURE 162, 162-63 (Rob-
ert Posted., 1991). Adams once remarked, "(V]ery few men who have no property, 
have any judgment of their own." Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, in 9 THE. 
WoRKS OF joHN ADAMS 376 (C. Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1864). 
23 Nedelsky, supra note 22, at 164. The author continues, "Property effectively 
captures this link between liberty and security in that it literally loses its meaning 
without security. We mean by property that which is recognized to be ours and can-
not easily be taken from us-hence the connection between property and ... law and 
government." ld. at 165. 
24 This, of course, is consistent with Charles Reich's renowned article, The New 
Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). In calling for a new definition of property, Reich 
asserts: "Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or 
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tions of property, offers an unparalleled symbol of autonomy and indi-
vidual freedom.25 
In short, the concept of property is a powerful rhetorical device. 
Understanding security in terms of "property" implies a close affilia-
tion with that device, and pronouncing the security to be "property" 
thus captures a set of highly revered associations. That, it seems to us, 
diminishes mightily the prospect of unseating the conveyancing meta-
phor now or in the future.26 To exalt the security interest to the level 
of property is to corroborate and firmly embed the Article 9 first-in-
time priority into the legal landscape in a manner that assures the 
supremacy of secured creditors for a long time to come.27 To control 
the metaphor by which secured credit is understood is to control pre-
sumptively the outcome in priority disputes between secured and un-
secured creditors. In the most recent reform, the drafters of Revised 
Article 9 ~ontrolled the metaphor, with predictable consequences.28 
organization. Within that circle the owner has a greater degree of freedom than with-
out. ... Within, he is master, and the state must explain and justifY any interference." 
ld. at 771. 
25 Nedelsky, supra note 22, at 166-67; see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New 
Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 
BuFF. L. REv. 325, 328-30 (1980) (claiming that the conceptual shift in the early twen-
tieth century from property as "thing ownership" to the bundle of rights metaphor 
devalued the serviceability of property in defining the boundaries between the indi-
vidual and the state). 
26 The alignment of security with property exploits allied notions: the sanctity of 
freedom of contract and free alienability of property. They may be part of the basis 
for property priority generally. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2261. 
There is a tasty irony in the association of secured credit with property and the noble 
entailments that follow from that association. If early on property ownership was sym-
bolic of autonomy, virtuous labor, and liberty, the prospect of a debtor having posses-
sion of collateral while its value resided in a creditor was regarded as fraud. See, e.g., 
Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 279-80 (Pa. 1819). These courts reasoned that 
the debtor with possession of the mortgaged collateral was in a position to dupe other 
creditors into the mistaken belief that the encumbered asset would be available to 
satisfy their unsecured claims in the event of default. Of course, Article 9 resolved the 
"ostensible ownership" problem-the problem that the collateral in the hands of the 
debtor looks precisely the same after its value has been conveyed away to the secured 
creditor as it did before. See U.C.C. § 9-205 cmt. 2. However, the problems associated 
with the redistributive effect of security, obviously, remain. 
27 Simply put, we believe those who are convinced more secured credit is better 
than less will not relinquish the powerful ally they find in property as a legal category. 
See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with lmpeifect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority 
Debates, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1373, 1386 (1997) ("The credit-constriction claim is the 
most forceful weapon in the arsenal of the proponents of full priority."). 
28 See supra note 1 7 and accompanying text. 
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Assured of priority, so the theory goes, the pmveyors of debt fi-
nancing will more readily part with their capital and more readily ac-
cept risk that would be intolerable without the comfort of collateral to 
hedge the risk of insolvency. Affordable (and, ergo, abundant) 
credit-undeniably a good thing in terms of promoting en-
trepreneurial activity and sustaining business growth-nevertheless 
sours if not disciplined in some manner to ensure the reasonable 
alignment of risk and reward.29 Among other salutary effects, the 
threat of withdrawal of the privileges attendant to taking security 
might encourage secured lenders to engage in more rational credit 
decisions, as well as more careful monitoring of credit once extended, 
albeit possibly at somewhat higher credit costs in certain cases.30 To 
be sure, a more balanced approach to the revision of Article 9 might 
have perhaps produced such a result and done so in a far more effi-
cient fashion than we propose here. Certainly the proposals were out 
there, but they were dismissed before they arrived.-'H They were dis-
missed precisely because they were at odds with the drafters' commit-
ment to a conveyance model of security. 
And so, we are resigned to the fact that no paradigm shift is in the 
offing, not in our lifetimes and probably well beyond. Revised Article 
9 has seen to it that propositional reasoning and an objectivist ap-
proach to legal categories will continue the intractable, outcome-re-
quired definition of security as "property" in the most ontological 
sense of the term. But that is by no means to suggest that alternative 
insights into conceptual categories cannot inform analysis and yet en-
able law transformation aimed at a more equitable distributive bal-
ance, or at least do so in the most egregious cases. The potential of 
those insights to accomplish both is explored in Part II, but first we 
offer a more detailed explanation of the contours and consequences 
of the conventional view of legal categories that controls our contem-
porary understanding of security. It is then against that backdrop that 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 101-08; infra note 209 and accompanying 
text. 
30 The empirical evidence is, frankly, still unanswered. Cf Ronald J. Mann, Ex-
plaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HA.Rv. L. REv. 625, 638-58 (1997) (offering 
some empirical evidence on what motivates parties to elect between secured and un-
secured credit). However, even accepting the proposition that full priority rules effec-
tively lower the cost of credit, this still begs the question of whether that is a good 
thing. Ultimately, the answer to that question depends on whether the reduction in 
the price of credit imposes costs on other parties, like unsecured creditors, in excess 
of the savings derived from security. See Warren, supra note 27, at 1388-92 (identifY-
ing other costs to consider beyond purely the price of credit). 
31 Seejanger, supra note 2, at 575; see also supra note 17 (discussing the rejection 
of the carve-out proposal in the Article 9 revision process). 
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we consider the perceptiveness and the possibilities offered by an al-
ternative approach to categorization of legal concepts as it applies to 
law in general, and security in particular. 
B. The Objectivist Account of Legal Categories 
While it is convenient fOl: many purposes to understand security 
in property terms, the conception of the security interest as property is 
by no means required.32 It is one thing to say that security is concep-
tually defined with reference to property concepts and something else 
again to observe that it is property in an a priori sense.33 
But that distinction, as fundamental and consequential as it may 
be, is often blurred or even lost because legal categories have come to 
be understood generally in conventional terms. And the conventional 
view has it that conceptual categories in law as elsewhere must be con-
structed by reference to necessary and sufficient indicia or conditions 
for category membership.34 In turn, those conditions are existentially 
determinate as are the categories they define. They are not, that is to 
say, dependent upon any contribution from the cognitive operators of 
the reasoner, but enjoy an ontological status quite apart from mental 
(conceptual) categories.35 A thing is inherently "Por not P" because 
it is possessed or not of the characteristics naturally residing in the 
category at hand. Category membership, as it comes to be deter-
mined, is therefore objectively verifiable by comparison to a set of 
conditions that obtain in the natural world external to human con-
32 See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their 
Assets on the Jo.ve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235, 
299 (1995) (arguing that the conveyance model of security leads to dysfunctional 
analysis of conversion of assets from nonexempt to exempt immediately before bank-
mptcy); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2284-86 (calling for a value-based, 
priority account of secured claims in bankruptcy instead of the prevailing conveyance 
model). As Professor Bjerre puts it, "[T]here is no ineluctable reason to consider ... 
security interests as property .... " Bjerre, supra note 15, at 363. There have been 
inroads on the conceptual monopoly. For instance, in bankmptcy, a secured credi-
tor's secured claim is limited to the value of the collateral, not the collateral itself. 11 
U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). The notion that a security interest does 
not necessarily encompass the right of possession is inconsistent with the concept of 
security as property in every particular. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for 
the Next Decade, 87 YALE LJ. 1012, 1028-30 (1978) (suggesting that the Code had 
moved incrementally away from the concept of security as property to a conception of 
the security interest as a priority claim). 
33 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2285. 
34 We refer here, of course, to the classical view of categories. It is, however, 
more than a view; rather, it is regularly taken as empirical fact. See LAKoFF, supra note 
19 at 6; Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355. 
35 See GEORGE LAKoFF & MARKJoHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE Bv 122-25 (1980). 
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cepts.36 Under the conventional view, then, it is the business of con-
ceptual categories not simply to emulate but literally to replicate 
objective reality, and they are at their worst when they befoul it by 
introducing imaginative principles.37 
For this to occur, conceptual categories are, or must be, precise 
representations of categories as they exist in the world external to the 
reasoner. And so, on this view, our conceptual categories are al-
gorithmic. They are correct when the symbols they make use of mir-
ror the reality they purport to represent. Otherwise, they are 
incorrect and there is neither room for near nor far membership. 
As noted earlier,38 the conventional view proceeds from objectiv-
ist assumptions about the world of experience,39 and in law finds ex-
pression in the dogma of formalism. The formalist strategy, so 
familiar by now as to be second nature in traditional legal analysis, is 
to abstract principles from cases, then apply those principles to suc-
ceeding cases.40 The principles themselves, on boiling away the fac-
tual content of the cases from which they are gleaned and extracted, 
now purport to be amenable to disinterested application in subse-
quent fact-rich cases by neutral judges. The neutrality can be sup-
posed, so long as the principles are properly understood and brought 
36 The popular view of conceptual categories "understands categorization either 
as about natural sets of objects in the world or, when it recognizes categorization as 
humanly constructed, as about objects with ascertainable properties or criteria that 
establish their commonality.n Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric 
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. ll05, 1108 (1989) (expli-
cating the work of Lakoff and Johnson on conceptual categories). The associated 
epistemology is sometimes referred to generally as "objectivism." See MARK JOHNSON, 
THE BoDY IN THE MIND 196 (1987); LAKoFF, supra note 19, at 157-84. On the objectiv-
ist account, the world is comprised of various phenomena, events, and objects inher-
ently possessed of naturally occurring characteristics, properties and relationships. 
These are mind-independent. I d. at 8-11; see also RicHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND Os. 
JECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 8 (1983) (using the term "objectivism" in the same sense as 
Lakoff and Johnson). 
37 Professor Bjerre states it nicely: "Every categorization question thus has a sim-
ple, yes or no answer; the o~ect either belongs or does not belong, and no intermedi-
ate result is possible. Under this view, we categorize stimuli based solely on objective 
criteria that are independent of the imagination .... The categorization process is com-
puter-like in its objectivity, impersonality and bipolarity." Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355 (em-
phasis added) (footnote omitted). 
38 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
39 See supra notes 36-37. 
40 The methodology is familiar. Principles are abstracted from cases to be re-
stated as legal propositions. Thereafter, it is only a matter of bringing the proposi-
tions to bear on the facts at hand. See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of judging, 54 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 151, 155 (1981). 
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to bear, because the principles themselves transcend their concrete 
instantiations in particular casesY 
In this way, objectivism is quietly but forcefully at work in law. 
The objectivist program generally insists that knowledge results from 
discovering concepts, which directly reflect an objectively verifiable 
state of affairs in the physical world, that are in no way dependent on 
subjective interpretation.42 Formalism presumes a uniquely correct res-
olution of legal issues: rights are rights, privileges are privileges, a 
thing is property or it is not, and, if it is, it is property for all purposes, 
and that is that. 43 This is the sense in which the security interest 
comes to find inclusion in the conceptual category determined to be 
"property." 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF CATEGORIES: PROPER'IY AS A 
RAnw.. CATEGORY 
A. Insights of the Cognitive Sciences into the Nature of Categories 
Beginning in the 1980s, research in the cognitive sciences and 
linguistics developed the insight that imaginative cognitive devices are 
central to human knowledge, understanding, and rationality.44 The 
view of human cognition to emerge from that work has been referred 
to by its chief architects as "experientialism,"45 and stands in sharp 
contradistinction to the underlying precepts of objectivism. The case 
was made that metaphor, for example, is a pervasive and critical com-
ponent of human reasoning processes.46 Metaphoric concepts are 
41 See Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1560-61. 
42 See joHNSON, supra note 36, at xxi-xxiv. At the root of objectivism, then, is an 
epistemology of transcendentalism. 
43 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the 
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 881-90 (1989). 
44 "Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful." joHNSON, 
supra note 36, at ix; see also i.AKoFF & joHNSON, supra note 35, at 3 (making the claim 
that ordinary human conceptual systems are metaphoric). 
45 See LAKoFF, supra note 19, at xv; see generally i.AKoFF & joHNSON, supra note 35, 
at 226-28 (noting that experientialism denies both that absolute truth exists and that 
it is necessary to function successfully). The methodology suggested by the insights of 
the experientialist program has been brought to bear in legal analysis from time to 
time. See, e.g., Bjerre, supra note 15; Knippenberg, supra note 13; Ponoroff & Knip-
penberg, supra note 32; Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8; Winter, supra note 36. 
46 See, e.g., Gerald W. Casenave, Taking Metaphor Seriously: The Implications of the 
Cognitive Significance of Metaphor for Theories of Language, 17 SJ. PHIL. 19 ( 1979); Paul 
Ricoeur, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling, 5 CRITICAL IN· 
QUIRY 143 (1978). The most comprehensive, systematic, and important treatment of 
the role of metaphor in human cognition is to be found in the work of Lakoff and 
Johnson. See, e.g., LAKoFF, supra note 19, at 276-78; LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note 35, 
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much more than rhetorical contrivances to be consigned to the do-
main of the poetic.47 Rather, in direct contravention to the objectivist 
account, experientialism teaches that our metaphoric concepts are 
central to cognitive operations. 
Metaphoric reasoning is primary in complex thought; that is to 
say, it is fundamental to all but the most rudimentary concepts,48 and, 
of equal import, it is unavoidable. The essence of metaphoric reason-
ing makes it possible to understand and reason about concepts that 
lack natural dimensions of their own in terms of other well-defined 
concepts,49 and to do so without declaring the former to be the latter 
in a literal sense. A simple example from legal doctrine serves to illus-
trate. The concept, "contract," is partially delineated by the meta-
phor, "a-contract-is-a-container-for-the-contracting-parties." The 
metaphoric concept is evident in the language. For instance, parties 
"enter into the contract" and "cannot get out of the contract."50 
at 6l-105;joHNSON, supra note 36, at 65-100. They refer to their account of human 
rationality and associated epistemology as "experiential realism" or, simply, "experien-
tialism." See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at xv. Other scholarly exegesis of metaphor has 
been undertaken by rhetoricians and other language scholars, among them Max 
Black. See MAX BLAcK, MoDELS AND METAPHOR 25-47, 49 (1962). For a more com-
plete listing, see Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053 (1989). 
47 See joHNSON, supra note 36, at 112 ("[M)etaphors ... are not merely conve-
nient economies for expressing our knowledge; rather they are our knowledge .... "); 
see also LAKoFF & JoHNSON, supra note 35, at 5 ("The metaphor is not merely in the 
words we use-it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is 
not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal."). 
48 Rudimentary concepts are those apprehended directly through our senses, 
from interaction with our physical surroundings. They include such concepts as "up-
down," "containment," "verticality," "part-whole," "front-back," and so forth. LAKoFF 
& JoHNSON, supra note 35, at 57. These are "natural kinds of experience," as they 
have naturally occurring dimensions and so are directly understood on their own 
terms-not in terms of other concepts-without the necessity of sophisticated cogni-
tive mechanisms such as metaphoric reasoning. !d. at 117-19. These experiences are 
meaningful because they recur endlessly as we interact with our physical surround-
ings. JoHNSON, supra note 36, at 13. These recurring patterns are the basis for kines-
thetic image schematic structures, or "image schema." ld. at 28-30. 
49 This is the essence of the experientialist claim. For example, the concept 
"trouble" lacks natural dimensions of its own, and so must be understood indirectly 
through the metaphor, "trouble-is-a-container." The emergent concept, "contain-
ment," partially delineates the concept "trouble," such that we can understand our-
selves as being "in trouble," or unable to "get out of trouble." LAKoFF & joHNSON, 
supra note 35, at 29-32. The stick-like, simple structure of image schematic concepts, 
such as "containment,n allow for this kind of cross-conceptualization. !d. at 29. 
50 Of course, the single ontological metaphor does not offer a complete under-
standing of the target concept. Instead, the metaphor highlights one aspect of the 
concept under consideration. Multiple metaphors must be deployed to enrich other 
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Another vital component of human rationality, and of immediate 
relevance to this Article, is categorization.51 The process is critical to 
making sense of our experience and, as shown above, it can influence 
our understanding of legal concepts. The insights of the experiential-
ist program have shown that human conceptual categories are not (or 
do not have to be) constructed around mind-independent objects 
with innate properties that are perfunctorily compared with a set of 
naturally occurring conditions of category membership. 52 To the con-
trary, categories, like other components of rationality, are dependent 
upon imaginative, or creative, conceptual principles.53 
While other types of conceptual category structures have been 
catalogued, 5 4 the "radial" category is directly apposite for present pur-
poses and exists in sharp contrast to the conventional view of catego-
ries that has pervaded legal thought and reasoning. Radial categories 
are ideational constructs of rationality. According to the experiential-
ist view, radial categories are structured around a central category 
member, or so-called "best example."55 This is the category proto: 
type.56 Categorization then entails determining if, and the degree to 
which, a stimulus under consideration shares properties with the cen-
tral category member. 5 7 The extent and level of sharing-the degree 
to which the stimulus is representative of the category as expressed 
through the category prototype-determines relative membership. 
aspects of the concept to arrive at meaning. For instance, contract obligations are 
also understood metaphorically as physical burdens. jOHNSON, supra note 36, at 35. 
51 See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at 5 ("There is nothing more basic than categoriza-
tion to our thought, perception, action, and speech."). 
52 JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 24. 
53 Under the experientialist view, categories are conceptual, that is to say, con-
structs of imaginative human perception, rather than inherent properties of objects. 
ld. at 23-28. Thus, conceptual categories are not slices of reality trapped and mim-
icked symbolically; rather, they are our reality. They are the means by which experi-
ence is organized and made meaningful. For an excellent, manageable summation of 
these principles, see Winter, supra note 36, at 1148-56. 
54 See Lakoff, supra note 19, at 287-88 (describing, for example, graded and sca-
lar categories). 
55 Bjerre, supra note 15, at 356. 
56 Professor Bjerre offers the simple but instructive example-the conceptual cat-
egory "cup." [d. at 356-57. Mter noting the failure of the objectivist account of con-
ceptual categories to account for the manner in which we deploy that category in 
experience, he explains: "The radial approach offers a much more satisfactory expla-
nation: the prototypical characteristics of a cup can be said to be exemplified by a 
coffee cup or a teacup, and everything else to which we apply the word 'cup' shares 
one or more of those characteristics according to various principles." I d. 
57 See id. at 355-56. For an extended discussion of the context of legal categoriza-
tion, see Winter, supra note 36, at 1148-59. 
2006] HAVING ONE'S PROPERTY AND EATING IT TOO g8g 
The radial model thus admits of "graded" membership, in a man-
ner that conventional categories do not,58 such that category mem-
bers may be understood to "radiate" from the category prototype. 59 
Where the reasoner is persuaded (although, actually, most categoriza-
tion occurs at the unconscious level60) that there is a correspondence 
of characteristics and a sufficient degree of correspondence, category 
membership is assigned and awarded. Otherwise, it is denied.61 
It is important to recognize that characteristic sharing is not lim-
ited to literal sharing. Correspondence of characteristics can indeed, 
and frequently do, occur at the nonliterallevel. For instance, a poten-
tial member might share traits with the category prototype at the met-
aphoric level through extension.62 The principle is illustrated using 
the security interest as an example in Part II.B., which follows. 
B. Property Understood as a Radial Category 
The legal conceptual category "property," like any other concep-
tual category, can be structured radially.63 This produces a much 
more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the concept and 
what it means to be a member of the category than can be had under 
the conventional view. The central member, or category prototype, 
might be the "house,"64 and its salient features would include at least 
the following: a physical locus and stability over time. The house is 
58 See supra text accompanying note 430 
59 See LAKoFF, supra note 19, at 91-114. 
60 "Ontological metaphors 0 0 . are so pervasive in our thought that they are usu-
ally taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena." LAK.oFF & JoHN-
soN, supra note 35, at 28. 
61 This is not the same as asserting that category membership is assigned on the 
basis of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, it is to say that, "At some point, 
the resemblance of a stimulus to a prototype grows weak enough (though it may still 
exist) that people do not include the stimulus in the category. This point is deter-
mined not by any objective measure, but by tacit social convention. This convention is 
presumably based, in turn, on a balance between the usefulness and the confusion 
that would result from inclusion." Bjerre, supra note 15, at 356 & no202; see also 
LAKoFF & JoHNSON, supra note 35, at 145 (making a similar point). 
62 Four such principles have been identified and described, including extension 
by metaphor. For a truncated but enlightening account of the principles of extension 
illustrated utilizing the legal category "property," see Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355 & 
no202. 
63 Our treatment of the conceptual category "property" as a radial category draws 
on the work of Professor Bjerre. See id. at 354-64. 
64 ld. at 357 no2080 As Professor Bjerre explains: 
While this choice is not inevitable, it is strongly justifiable. In my own un-
scientific survey . o 0 the image most strongly called to nearly everyone's mind 
by the word property was the single-family house surrounded by land. It is 
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utile and functional. It offers, among other things, safety, security, 
and a place of residence. It has value and so represents a source of 
wealth. It is freely alienable by the owner, who has the nearly absolute 
right to deploy its value according to his or her whim. Value added by 
way of improvements inure to the benefit of the owner. The house 
quite literally serves to exclude others than the owner and the owner 
has the right to exclude as well. So what do houses have to do with 
security interests? 
Under the radial model, the security interest finds its way into the 
legal category "property" not because it is a house of course, but ow-
ing instead to the characteristics it shares with the category prototype, 
literally and nonliterally.65 Literally, the security interest is alienable; 
it represents a form of wealth and, arguably, is the product of the 
owner's labor.66 But it is obvious that the security interest is more 
representative of the prototype at the metaphoric level, the level at 
which there is a closer correspondence of traits that explain inclusion 
of the security interest in the property category. For example, the se-
curity interest in inventory, accounts, and other self-renewing forms of 
collateral enjoys stability or duration.67 The security interest itself is 
also the meaning most likely to be carried by a layperson's use of the term: 
'Get off of my property!' 
ld. Because central membership is a matter of cultural consensus, central members 
may come and go over time as the common perception as to the best representative of 
the category changes. See Winter, supra note 36, at 1172-74 (describing the changing 
conception of the term "park" in the context of an ordinance prohibiting vehicles in 
city parks). Professor Jeanne Schroeder, though she does not analyze property as a 
radial category in the terms supplied by the experientialist program, nevertheless un-
dertakes to isolate and describe prototypical property. She posits that a grasped tangi-
ble object may be at the center of the conceptual category. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some 
Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARv L. REv. 455, 491 (1996). Schroeder's 
account of prototypical property forms part of the basis for her earlier article, Jean L. 
Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-Q.Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 
MICH. L. REv. 239 ( 1994) [hereinafter Schroeder Bundle of Stix) (examining Jeremy 
Waldron's definition of Property). 
65 Professor Bjerre illustrates the literal and nonliteral sharing of characteristics 
using the patent, as well as the security interest, as examples. Bjerre, supra note 15, at 
359-61. 
66 Bjerre acknowledges that, perhaps, there is a lingering bias against the notion 
that lending is "productive work." The form-of-wealth characteristic might, however, 
as easily be expressed as the form-of-protection trait. ld. at 360 n.217. 
67 ld. at 361. This is the so-called floating lien, frequently expressed in the famil-
iar, cloud-over-a-river metaphor. The fluctuating mass of self-renewing collateral is 
conceptualized as a gestalt, a single entity that grows and shrinks. See also Knip-
penberg, supra note 13, at 1580 (making the claim that Gilmore's "unitary view" of 
the security interest is based on the metaphor, "the-security-interest-is-an-expanding 
mass" in the context of future advances). 
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not a tangible thing, but one of the most singular remedies available 
to the secured creditor is the right to seize the tangible personal prop-
erty. 58 The right to seize the collateral is conflated with the collateral 
seized, creating a recognizable, nonliteral correspondence with the 
traits of the tangible category prototype.69 The security interest liter-
ally offers "security"-protection, that is to say-from intruders in the 
form of other creditors who would lay claim to the collateral; and the 
secured creditor has the right to exclude others (other claimants) 
who endeavor to gain priority to the collateral. 
The security interest is thus a member of the property category by 
dint of radial extension from the category prototype accomplished 
metaphorically.70 On acknowledging that the security interest is prop-
erty, but only by virtue ofradial extension of a conceptual category, the 
way is cleared to do a critical examination of judgments about the 
merits (or demerits) of security. By critical examination, we mean an 
assessment of the impact of security, and more particularly the rules 
relating to the priority of secured claims, on a basis other than pro-
positional results dictated by an unyielding assertion that security is 
property. 
This brings us to Revised Article 9. It is likely that the revision 
process of the 1990s was the last great opportunity for granting that 
secured credit might be usefully conceived of as property, but that it 
need not be so for all purposes. It was an opportunity, that is to say, to 
acknowledge the property I conveyance metaphor to be precisely 
that-a metaphor-no less and certainly no more.71 The revision 
process presented a forum to entertain models other than the prevail-
ing conveyance model in response to legitimate anxiety over the dis-
68 u.c.c. § 9-609 (2006). 
69 Bjerre, supra note 15, at 361. "At work here ... is a metonymy [where the part 
stands for the whole, as in the expression, 'All hands on deck1']: when we speak of a 
security interest as property, we understand the right to seize the collateral in terms of 
the collateral itself." I d. at n.220 (alteration in original). 
70 The phenomenon of radial extension also accounts for the fact that category 
members may share little in common with each other. 
71 Metaphoric mapping, with the inferential consequences arising from import-
ing entailments to the target domain, allows rational inferences about the target con-
cept. The point to be taken is this: metaphoric reason is, by hypothesis, partiaL Since 
source and target concepts do not correspond dimension-by-dimension, no one 
source concept can fully elaborate a target concept. Multiple metaphors must be 
deployed to provide multiple levels of meaning. The failure to recognize that insight 
forecloses the introduction of additional source metaphors to enrich meaning, and 
hides the differences between source and target concepts. See LAKoFF & jOHNSON, 
supra note 35, at 10; see also Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1571 (making the same 
point). 
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tributive effects of secured credit on unsecured creditors. The 
abiding concern that secured credit, and near-absolute priority af-
forded properly perfected secured claims, unfairly externalized risk 
(yielding distributive injustice) were certainly raised, and vigorously 
so,72 but ultimately were dismissed by the drafters without much pause 
and certainly without much consideration.73 In the end, security re-
mained property absolutely. The opportunity for law transformation 
at the direct conceptual level has thus come and gone. However, the 
wholesale embracement of the traditional property-based account of 
security in the revision does not foreclose further consideration within 
the perimeters established and dictated by that model, as we turn to 
next. 
C. The Conveyance Mod£l, Nemo Dat, and the Consequences for the 
Credit Community 
To call the security interest "property" is to import entailments, 
or epistemic consequences, associated with that legal category. Those 
entailments are the basis for the irresistible property priority of se-
cured claims that dominated the Article 9 revision process. In this 
section, we detail some of the entailments allied with the legal cate-
gory property, as well as consideration of their consequential signifi-
cance for secured credit. 
A familiar metaphor structures our understanding of property in 
the most elemental manner. Both the historical and contemporary 
system of American property law rest squarely on the metaphor of 
72 In at least academic circles, the process was something of a showdown on these 
matters. Proposals designed to ameliorate or annul the distributive effects on un-
secured creditors came from both predictable sources and strange bedfellows. See 
Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 8, at 899-900; Warren, supra note 16, at 323-25. 
73 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision ojU.C.C. Article 9: Reflections of the Reporters, 
74 CHI.-KE.NT L. REv. 1357, 1358-60 (1999) (suggesting a sensitivity on the part of the 
Revised Article 9 Drafting Committee to the interests of unsecured creditors). Profes-
sor ]anger provides an exceptional treatment of the events and discourse of the revi-
sion meetings. See generally ]anger, supra note 2. In that article, he describes two 
fundamental kinds of reform in the revision effort. One he characterizes as reform 
aimed at ~simplicity," the other at "safety." See id. at 573-74. Reforms of the first type 
had in mind the ease and certainty with which secured creditors might go about their 
business. For example, long-standing technical matters that have plagued the filing 
system were addressed. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of lncarporation 
Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577, 
593-619 (1995). It appears there was much consensus on those issues. ]anger, supra 
note 2, at 573. Not so, the issues and accompanying proposals concerning distributive 
justice and the priority of secured creditors. !d. 
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ownership as a collection of distinct, though homologous, rights or 
interests-the celebrated "bundle of sticks."74 It is that metaphor-
the favorite of the inspired notion that ownership can be frag-
mented-which allows the owning of nearly anything in bits and 
pieces, for this period of time or that, whether the thing owned be 
tangible or ethereal.75 Fragmented ownership admits the ingenious 
possibility that constituent ownership interests can part company to be 
held in different hands at once, and that possibility allows the imagi-
native divorcement of possession and use, on the one hand, from its 
value,76 on the other, as by mortgage or hypothecation.77 So it is that 
the use and enjoyment of an object of ownership may reside in the 
74 The metaphor is familiar to every law student. Among the most renowned of 
"sticks" is possession. The holder of this stick is entitled to continue in possession 
against all but the "true owner," presumably a figure with more sticks. See R.H. Helm-
holz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1221, 1230 (1986). Under the common law, possession is, so to say, the origin or root 
of property ownership. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Pmperty, 52 U. C1-11. L. 
REv. 73 (1985). An early sighting of the metaphor can be found in BENJAMIN N. CAR-
DOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928). For an unusual treatment of, 
among other things, the bundle metaphor, see Schroeder, Bundle-0-Stix, supra note 
64. 
75 Thus, possession can be divorced from other interests (e.g., the right to sue for 
damages for injury to property). The notion of fragmented ownership likewise moti-
vates the prospect of ownership for specified intervals of time necessary to the con-
cepts associated with estates in land. See generally WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, THE LAw OF PROPER1Y §§ 2.1-.17 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing present and 
future estates). 
76 A second, ontological metaphor requires that value be understood as a thing, 
so that it might be given, measured, and so forth. Once conceived of (metaphori-
cally) in that way, the metaphor can be elaborated, so that value can be transferred 
away-conveyed-while other aspects of ownership remain in the hands of others. 
See Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1971-73; Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 32, 
at 314; see also Schroeder, Bundle-0-Stix, supra note 64, at 239 n.2 ("[I] n contemporary 
legal discourse the most common conception of property is the bundle of legally pro-
tected interests, held together by competing and conflicting policy goals. The re-
moval of one or more sticks from the bundle should have no particular implications 
for the legally protected interests that remain."). 
77 We use the terms "mortgage" and "hypothecation" in a broad sense here, so as 
to include not only real estate, but similar interests in personalty, both tangible and 
intangible. Indeed, dividing ownership and isolating its member parts so that they 
might lead independent economic lives enables far more than this. It means that the 
places we occupy may not belong to us at all, that the things we use daily in our work 
and home life are often not altogether ours exclusive of the ability of another to 
successfully assert a claim to them. Ownership in part is central to every transaction 
with any claim to sophistication or consequence beyond the absolutely fundamental. 
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debtor, with its value detached and relocated m the secured 
creditor. 78 
An inescapable imperative emerges from the metaphor of owner-
ship as a bundle of sticks or (the less whimsical) bundle of rights. 
Once dealt out of the bundle, property rights cannot be dispensed 
from the same bundle a second time. This ordinance finds expression 
in the proverbial commercial law maxim, nemo dat quod habet. The 
ruling on the matter is not arbitrary, but follows necessarily from un-
derstanding property according to the bundle metaphor.79 
On the coventional property-based account of security, the secur-
ity agreement is more deed than contract.80 The value stick passes out 
of the bundle and into the coffers of the secured creditor, where it is 
irreclaimably beyond the reach of unsecured creditors,B1 both those 
who voluntarily transacted with the debtor (e.g., trade creditors), and 
those upon whom the claim was foisted (tort creditors).82 Since the 
security interest is property, while the interests of unsecured creditors 
are not, the value deeded away is gone. Thus ends any priority battle 
between secured and unsecured creditors. If this is the beginning and 
78 See Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1972. 
79 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing entailments and meta-
phoric mapping). 
80 Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2051-52; see also Knippenberg, supra note 
15, at 1972 (suggesting that the security agreement is a kind of deed because it is 
more an instrument of conveyance than an instrument setting the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2287 (discussing the 
consistency of the security interest with the conveyance metaphor, which allows for a 
physical transfer of lien rights from the debtor to the creditor). 
81 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2262. 
82 This is the essence of Professor LoPucki's claim that security cannot be de-
cently justified. He submits that unsophisticated, unsecured creditors are ignorant of 
the risks of secured credit, and so do not bargain meaningfully with the debtor who 
has encumbered his assets. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1916-20. Tort claimants, of 
course, do not bargain with tortious debtors, nor do they have the opportunity to 
decline to "transact" with the debtor from whom they seek recovery. See generally id. at 
1896-1902 (noting that a substantial portion of unsecured debt of persons filing 
bankruptcy was owed to "reluctant" creditors such as tort claimants). An early sight-
ing of the proposition that tort claimants should be awarded priority over secured 
creditors can be found in Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the 
Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1045 (1984). 
Others have followed, for example, Rebecca]. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All 
Limited Liability f-nterprises: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. 
GIN. L. REv. 95 (2001); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 
91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1565 (1991). But see Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1980-82 (ar-
guing that LoPucki's insistence on tort victim priority can be seen as a shift in man-
agement responsibility from the debtor to the secured creditor, which, while arguably 
justified, must first be defended on some explicit nonnative basis). 
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end of analysis, then the first-in-time priority rule that squeezes out 
unsecured creditors is both inevitable and intractable. 
The consequences that attend pronouncing the security interest 
property are also the sum and substance of the so-called "property-
based defense" of security.83 On creation of the security interest, 
value in the collateral is conveyed to the secured creditor such that it 
is no longer accessible to other creditors seeking to satisfy their 
claims. Prevailing outcome-required analysis premised on the extant 
conveyance model and its chief feature, the principle of nemo dat, as-
sures the first-in-time priority rule that favors the secured creditor, but 
there is more. 
Starting from the implicit, but still unsubstantiated assumption 
that the credit is good, the more the better, and that secured credit is 
best, the proliferation of rules to enhance security became paramount 
in the development of the commercial law over the past half-century. 
For this to occur, creation and perfection of the security interest cer-
tainly had to be "facilitated."84 More to the point, however, the secur-
ity interest would be "property," bestowing it with a set of powerful 
political and emotive associations, not to mention a commanding pri-
ority unique to property.85 Further, Article 9 would abstain from pro-
viding a definition of personal property and fixtures, the stuff to 
which the security interest might attach, so that an endless parade of 
83 See generally Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2025-37 (arguing that giving 
security for debt neither harms nor increases the risk to a debtor's unsecured credi-
tors); Stephen J. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and 
Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1349, 1356-70 (1997) (arguing that subordinating secured credit to un-
secured claims would materially reduce the availability of credit to parties that need it 
most such as distressed businesses). As noted earlier, security has been assailed both 
on the grounds that it is inefficient in a macroeconomic sense, and simply unfair to 
unsecured creditors. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Theodore Eisen-
berg, The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 V AND. L. 
REv. 931, 953-55 (1985) (noting that a secured creditor's interest should be regarded 
as no more than a priority claim limited to the value of the collateral). 
84 See supra note 5 (noting the vision of the drafters of Article 9 was to make 
secured credit cheap and easy). This was likewise the continuing (and expanded) 
mission of the revision process. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The 
Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 
577-80 (1993) (discussing the recommendations made in the 1992 report of the 
U.C.C. Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 Study Committee, for which the authors 
also served as reporters). 
85 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; see also infra note 109 and ac-
companying text (noting that security interests constitute prioritized property). 
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newly emerging interests might become collateral, and, thereby, suc-
cumb to the secured party's property claim.86 
As more interests are promoted to the status of "property," more 
interests become available for hypothecation. The security interest-
conclusively understood to be property in those interests87-is 
freighted with all the implications associated with property.8 8 An ex-
panding list of collateral, in turn, invites more ''cross-boundary" con-
flicts89 and further intrusion upon the status and interests of 
unsecured creditors.90 Because the interests of the latter are per-
ceived as less than property, however, they stand no chance in the 
battle for assets with the perfected security interest. All conflicts are 
86 The scope of Revised Article 9, like its predecessor, continues to reach any 
transaction, regardless of form, that creates a consensual security interest in personal 
property or fixtures, unless explicitly excluded from the article. U.C.C. § 9-
102(12) (B) (2006) and§ 9-104 (1972); U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (2006) and§ 9-102 (1972). 
Although the basic scope of the rule remained intact, the revision expanded the 
scope of Article 9 in several key respects, including the sale of most payment in-
tangibles (§ 9-l09(a) (3)) and elimination of the exclusion for deposit accounts (de-
fined in § 9-102(a) (29) ). Likewise, Revised Article 9 also covers sales of promissory 
notes (defined in U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(65)), largely included to facilitate securitization 
of this type of instrument. Furthermore, the scope of Article 9 does reach some real 
estate-like interests. Fixtures, as noted, have always been available as collateral (see 
U.C.C. § 9-334), and obligations may be used as collateral though those obligations 
might themselves be secured by real estate interests. U.C.C. § 9-l09(b). In addition, 
an Article 9 security interest can be taken in the non-Article 9 security device (mort-
gage or lien) that secures the obligation, provided the obligation and device are "cou-
pled." U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 7. At the same time, personal property is nowhere defined 
in Article 9. Simply put, if a thing is not realty, it is personalty, and its value may be 
conveyed in the form of a security interest. 
87 Professor Schroeder makes the case that the drafters of the U.C.C., in disclaim-
ing the relevance of title and embracing, instead, the bundle of rights paradigm, re-
stated the antiquated relationship of property to things-property reified: "[T]he 
legal realists rttiected the notion of title, not because it was unitary or objective, but 
precisely because it was insufficiently physical . ... They demanded that not only 
goods-which are by definition physical things-but also acts and words must become 
tangible." Schroeder, Bundle-0-Stix, supra note 64, at 310. Moreover, "[i]n order to 
make property tangible, the drafters identified property in the good with the good 
itself. Property interests in the good are made, as nearly as possible, equivalent to 
sensuous contact with the good." /d. 
88 See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra note 10. 
90 See also LoPucki, supra note 11, at 18 ("The effect [of simplifYing secured 
credit] was to increase dramatically the proportion of encumbered assets in the Amer-
ican economy."). The impact of expanding secured credit was apparent in bank-
ntptcy liquidations where distribution to unsecured creditors was significantly 
reduced. !d. 
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resolved ipso facto in favor of the secured claim, save for the precious 
few circumstances where Article 9 deigns to command otherwise.91 
If secured credit is a thing to be encouraged, it would seem the 
expansion of security accomplished under the revision of Article 9 
amounts to felicitous progress about which there should be much re-
joicing. On that view, the expansion of security would be something 
akin to the development of a modern economy, with its costs to be 
born by dilution of what are regarded as tangential interests necessa-
rily crowded out in the process.92 But there are insidious differences 
to be noted as well. 
First, the institution of secured credit does not await an emerging 
interest to be declared property by any authority external to Article 9 
itself. This is assured, in part, by the lack of definition of personalty.93 
On the bundle of rights conception, value is but one stick extracted 
from the bundle that constitutes property ownership, such that the 
object of the security interest from which the value has been conveyed 
must, by definition, itself be property.94 The conceptual imperialism 
of the property metaphor, confirmed and reiterated in the revision 
process, thus effectively endows Article 9 itself with the capacity to de-
termine what interests might be called property. 
Next, the prevailing ideation of the security interest enjoys a 
Blackstonian-like conceptualization of property.95 That paradigm, 
however, in the world of real property in which it developed, necessa-
rily involved conflict when competing interests collided,96 as well as 
attendant rules and limitations to resolve such conflicts in a manner 
that accommodated those interests. In a world where conflicts do not 
arise, or are summarily dismissed in most cases,97 it is possible to en-
tertain a definition that awards the security interest a status of prop-
erty amounting to absolute dominion.98 The point to be made is that 
91 The basic priority rule in U .C. C. § 9-201 (a) (2006) confers a blanket priority 
on the secured claim over essentially the whole world. The balance of the specific 
priority rules in subpart 3 of Part Ill of Article 9 then operate as exceptions to the 
general rule, including the occasional elevation of nonsecured claimants, as in the 
case of certain non-Article 9 liens arising by operation of law. U.C.C. § 9-333. 
92 See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. 
93 See supra text accompanying note 86. 
94 See supra note 76. 
95 See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra note 91. 
98 Where neighboring property owners undertake no activities which intrude on 
the absolute dominion of the other, no conflict arises. Absent cross-boundary con-
flicts, it matters little whether both are regarded as enjoying absolute dominion and 
the attendant freedom from interference that is implied. See also infra notes 136-38 
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where the interests of unsecured creditors are not dignified with the 
classification "property," there are no cross-boundary conflicts that are 
not instantly resolved simply because security is property and the com-
peting unsecured interest is not. 
Finally, cross-border conflicts would be avoided in the realm of 
secured credit whether or not the rights and interests of unsecured 
creditors were regarded as property. Although enshrined with the 
paramount rights of real property, the security interest is not an inter-
est in land. Thus, with its first-in-time priority, it has heretofore been 
insulated from scrutiny as a nuisance even of the watered-down variety 
that emerged with the shift to the modern economy.99 In sum, the 
security interest as property, unlike a property interest in land, has no 
natural enemies. In this, the security interest is property of a special 
and exalted sort, presenting a singular example of eating one's cake 
and having it to boot. 
D. Nemo Dat Gone Mad: Security as a Judgment-Proofing Strategy 
Where a debtor either has no assets, or has assets inaccessible to 
judgment creditors through execution, that debtor is effectively judg-
ment proof. 100 There are several strategies by which a debtor may be 
rendered judgment proof, including secured credit, the most an-
cient-if no longer the most common-method. 101 Under that strat-
egy, the debtor issues debt secured by a pervasive lien on its assets in 
an amount that immediately or seasonably thereafter exceeds the liq-
uidation value of the encumbered assets, which thus become instantly 
inaccessible to unsecured creditors, certainly those withoutjudgments 
and even those whose claims have been reduced to judgment. Now, 
with no further risks to be incurred, and all external discipline dissi-
pated, the fun begins.102 
and accompanying text (discussing the concept of absolute dominion in the context 
of indirect invasion). 
99 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
100 LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1 n.4. "The liability system works solely through the 
entry and enforcement of money judgments. Debtors can defeat it by rendering 
themselves judgment proof." Id. at 14. 
101 LoPucki identifies and describes four judgment-proofing strategies: secured 
debt strategies, ownership strategies (by shuffling assets to subsidiaries or through 
asset securitization), exemption strategies, and foreign haven strategies. Id. at 14-38. 
More recently, "on-shore" havens might be added to the list. See john K. Eason, Home 
from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact Traditional &tate and 
Gift Tax Planning, 52 FLA. L. REv. 41, 53-63 (2000). 
102 See Steven Shavell, The judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 45, 
47-54 (1986) (discussing the suboptimal incentives in terms of exercising ordinary 
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Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a lively debate 
among academic commentators regarding the limits of liability-limit-
ing techniques, or, more colorfully stated, about a phenomenon that 
has come to bear the moniker 'judgment-proofing." 103 While judg-
ment-proofing strategies are not by any means confined to the ability 
under Article 9 to subordinate unsecured claims to secured debt, 104 
clearly the ability under Article 9, as revised, for creditors to engage in 
broad all-asset lending has contributed to the concern. 105 The cur-
rent regime allows corporate borrowers and their secured lenders to 
care, purchasing liability insurance, etc., that occur once debtors have effectively judg-
ment-proofed themselves). 
103 For a sampling of the debate, see LoPucki, supra note 11, 14-19; Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The &sential Structure of judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147, 149-50 
(1998) (suggesting that by creating judgment-proof structures, creditors lose the prac-
tical ability, albeit not the legal right, to enforce their claims); Schwarcz, supra note 
11, at 17-28 (1999) (suggesting that LoPucki is wrong because economic analysis 
makes it irrational for arms-length business transactions to be used as judgment-proof-
ing schema); White, supra note 11, at 1371-74 (arguing based on empirical analysis 
that LoPucki is wrong because the percentage of companies' assets hypothecated to 
secured debt has not been increasing). There has also been a rich literature devoted, 
if not to judgment-proofing per se, then to the related issue of imposing limits on 
limited liability, particularly with respect to tort claims, in order to create appropriate 
investment incentives and to reduce cost externalization. See, e.g., Leebron, supra 
note 82; Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 102 CoLUM. L. REv. 1203 (2002); Henry Nasmann & Reiner Kraakman, 
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). 
104 See supra note 101. For an overview of the mechanics of asset securitization, see 
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 
(1994). 
105 While beyond the scope of this Article-the nuisance metaphor may be an 
equally suitable way of thinking about challenging judgment-proofing mechanisms in 
these other contexts as well, such as securitization transactions, on the basis that trans-
fer of the securitized assets to the bankruptcy remote subsidiary is a misuse of prop-
erty, thus enhancing the case for recharacterizing the transfer as either a loan or a 
fraudulent conveyance. See generally David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of 
Securitization, 39 WM. & MARv L. REv. 1055, 1111-12 (1998) (maintaining that Bank-
ruptcy Code policy favors treating securitized assets in the same fashion as secured 
loans). Although not binding necessarily in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, an-
other important goal in the revision of Article 9 was to expand protection for and to 
facilitate securitization transactions. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitiza-
tion of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 947, 953-55 (1999) (discussing the 
ways in which Article 9 attempts to make the perfection process clearer and more 
practical); see also Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARoozo L. REv. 
1759, 1761 (2004) (citing recently adopted statutes that have "gerrymander[ed] state 
property law to provide a safe harbor for securitization transactions" and that provide 
an effective opt-out from Article 9). 
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externalize virtually all of the costs of insolvency. 106 This is most obvi-
ous in, but not necessarily limited to, the case of tort liability. 107 Exac-
erbated by the divergent motivations that sometimes emerge from the 
separation of ownership and management, 108 Article 9 arguably facili-
tates the extension of more credit than is optimal, at least from the 
perspective of distributional fairness. The statute's embracement of 
full priority, and the concomitant subordination of unsecured claims, 
makes this a logical but, as we hope to show, not a necessary, result. 
In its present form, secured credit is manifestly an ideal construct 
by which to judgment-proof debtors. The hegemony of the convey-
ance model, and the corresponding principle of nemo dat, together, 
ensure priority for perfected secured creditors as surely and inexora-
bly as night follows day. In other words, in the grand scheme of 
things, the property-based tenets on which security has come to be 
106 See Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 8, at 899-900 (explaining that the full prior-
ity for secured claims, when combined with the distortions already created by limited 
liability, leads firms "to underinvest iri precautions and overinvest in risky activities 
that externalize harm to other parties"). 
107 G. Eric Brunsted, Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A 'Theory on the 
Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 Bus. LAw. 499, 539 (2000) (suggesting that a firm's 
inability to pay unsecured claims is more detrimental to tort victims than trade credi-
tors); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE LJ. 387, 431 (2000) ("Tort victims have no control over the type of legal 
entity that injures them. Consequently, to make the amount recovered by a tort vic-
tim depend upon the legal form of the organization responsible for the tort is to 
permit the externalization of accident costs, and indeed to invite the choice of legal 
entity to be governed in important part by the desire to seek such externalization."); 
Charles W. Hendricks, Offering Tort Victims Some Solace: Why States Should Incorporate a 
20% Set-Aside Into Their Ver.sions of Article 9, 104 CoM. LJ. 265, 268-71 (1999) (urging 
adoption by the states of the Warren "carve-out" proposal); ]anger, supra note 2, at 
606 (pointing out that the availability of secured credit, when coupled with limited 
liability, could seriously erode the effectiveness of the tort liability system); Note, 
Switching Priorities: Elevating The Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal 
Deterrence, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2541, 2561-62 (2003) (making the case that the elevation 
of tort claims in bankruptcy would alleviate the externalization of liability in both 
liquidations and reorganizations). 
108 See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 568 (2003) (pointing out that shareholders of 
public companies are not in a position, legally or practically, to monitor and regulate 
the decisions of the day-to-day managers of the firm); Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging 
the Bargaining Tabl£: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441, 484-86 (1994) (discussing the sometimes 
incongruent interests of owners and professional managers in relation to initiation of 
bankruptcy). For a more general discussion of the agency problems inherent in the 
divergent interests of corporate managers and shareholders, see Elizabeth Chorvat, 
You Can't Take it With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate Expatriations, 37 U.C. DAvis 
L. REv. 453, 485-87 (2003). 
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understood create systematic opportunities, if not actual incentives, 
for judgment-proofing. 
Indeed, judgment-proofing through secured credit is simply the 
outcome of the ordinary operation of priority rules based on property 
ownership. Secured creditors have an ownership interest in the 
debtor's assets because the security is denominated to be "property," 
while judgment and other unsecured creditors own no property. 
Thus, the priority battle is over before it is pitched.109 
III. Src UTERE Tuo, UT ALrENUM NoN LAEoAS 
While there is, and has been, much criticism of the priority 
awarded secured credit,110 none, so far as we are aware, has proposed 
a rubric by which misuse of security might be arrested other than by 
challenging the basic precepts of the conveyance model-an exercise 
of interesting intellectual interest, but no more likely to have a practi-
cal effect than a knight on horseback is likely to do damage to a wind-
mill by charging it with a lance. In this Part, therefore, we propose a 
rubric for redressing the use of security as a judgment-proofing 
scheme that operates squarely within the boundaries of the property 
model. 
The approach we advance is suggested by the very decree that has 
declared security to be property, as emphatically confirmed in Revised 
Article 9. That is, with property rights come property responsibilities. 
In the law relating to real property, the very law that has come to 
structure the contemporary understanding of Article 9, one way in 
which property responsibility is imposed is through the law of nui-
sance, a tort that polices unreasonable uses of land. It is our belief 
that the doctrine of nuisance similarly offers a workable and concep-
tually compatible model for policing the misuse of security. To ex-
plore this possibility, an excursus into the law of nuisance is in order 
as follows. 
Nuisance law1 11 is rooted in profoundly held convictions about a 
landowner's unqualified right to prevent physical intrusion upon his 
109 In fact, we think it inaccurate to refer to a "priority dispute" in this context at 
all, as we believe that phrase implies the ordering of distribution among like claim-
ants. Secured creditors own the collateral; judgment creditors have no cognizable 
property, so there is no real dispute about priority that can in fact arise between them. 
110 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. 
111 The word, nuisance, has its etymology in the Latin, nocumentum, from which it 
found its way to become the French, nuisant, the present participle of nuire, which 
means ~[t]o be hurtful, injurious, or prejudicial ... to jeopardize, to harm; to stand in 
the way, to be an obstacle or hindrance." THE NEw CAssELL's FRENCH DICTIONARY 516 
(1962); see Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and 
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land. 112 Nuisance, that is to say, has its origins in the law of tres-
pass.113 As a cause of action, private nuisance has been something of a 
utility player, called upon to right wrongs against property and prop-
erty-like rights where redress cannot neatly be had otherwise. 114 
While the law of nuisance is far from elegant conceptually, 115 its evolu-
tion, and the historical context of that evolution, are observable and 
revealing for present purposes. 
The prototype of the conceptual category "trespass"-of which 
nuisance is a theoretical offspring-is the unprivileged entry in the 
Future, 54 ALB. L. REv. 189, 192 (1990) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs§ 86, at 617 n.7 (5th ed. 1984)). 
112 "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the 
storm may enter; but the King of England cannot enter!" William Pitt, Earl of Chat-
ham, Speech on the Excise Bill Before the House of Commons (Mar. 1763) in Ox-
FORD DicriONARY oF QuoTATIONS 515, 515 (4th ed. 1992); see also WILLIAM 
BlACKSTONE, 2 CoMMENTARIES *3 (private property entails the prerogative of "total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"). 
113 Private and public nuisance share the name "nuisance," but their heritage is 
quite different. Private nuisance, as noted in the text, has its lineage in the law of 
trespass and is aimed at the protection of interests related to land, if, in some cases, 
those interests seem far removed from what are by consensus property interests (e.g., 
"use and enjoyment"). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 87, at 618. Private nui-
sance, then, is a civil wrong, a tort. Public nuisance was a parallel development, but 
distinct from private nuisance: public nuisance was a crime against the crown. ld. at 
617. At the same time, the same acts constituting a public nuisance and so a crime 
may likewise constitute a private nuisance giving rise to a civil remedy in tort. Moreo-
ver, private individuals may seek a civil remedy in tort for public nuisance. ld. at 
617-18. The result is a conflation of the two concepts at the margins, such that the 
difference in the two, as a practical matter, may only be one of degree. That is, pri-
vate nuisance affects one or few, while public nuisance impacts greater numbers of 
the public. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.2, at 417-18. For an extended 
discussion of public nuisance, see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solv-
ing the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 EcoLoGY L.Q. 755 (200 1). 
114 KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 616 ("[Nuisance] has meant all things to all 
people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming adver-
tisement to a cockroach baked in a pie." (footnotes omitted)). For a compilation of 
commentary on the meaninglessness of the term "nuisance," see Jeremiah Smith, 
Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 109-12 (1921). 
115 Justice Blackmun complained that nuisance law was altogether unprincipled. 
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Common law nuisance has also been variously referred to as a "garbage can," 
William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 410 (1942), and a 
"mongrel." F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480, 480 (1949). 
While not particularly flattering appellations, the malleable and ill-defined perimeters 
of nuisance doctrine make it ideal for adaptation and, ergo, for our purposes. 
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person of the trespasser, 116 but entry in the form of some tangible 
thing wielded by or under the trespasser's control will do. 117 Both 
constitute physical invasion by the trespasser, one directly and one 
indirectly. 118 
At a certain point, one strays from the prototype category mem-
ber (physical entry of the trespasser) altogether into the derivative cat-
egory "nuisance."119 In conventional terms, trespass is distinguished 
from nuisance in that the former involves physical intrusion, while the 
latter does not. 120 The conceptual demarcation is quite distinct, even 
if the boundary often blurs owing to a seemingly crude distinction 
that conceives of large objects as instruments of trespass, but small 
116 STOEBVCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 411. Originally, the distinction 
between trespass and nuisance turned on the characterization of the physical intru-
sion as direct or indirect. Direct invasion constituted trespass, while indirect invasion 
constituted nuisance. The characterization was necessitated by the old forms of ac-
tion. Trespass was the appropriate action for direct physical invasion, but offered no 
remedy for indirect physical invasion, which, instead, was left to an action on the case. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 622. The distinction between direct and indirect 
invasion atrophied with the disappearance of the old forms of action. !d. The differ-
ence between the torts thereafter was cast in terms of the nature of the interest to be 
protected. Trespass disturbed exclusive possession of land, while nuisance was an af-
front to its use and enjoyment. !d. 
117 "Instrumentalities that can cause trespass are generally objects ... that have 
size and weight, whereas nuisances are generally caused by 'nonphysical' forces such 
as noise, odors, and vibration." STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 412; see 
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 619-20 (defming nuisance as "an interference 
with the use and enjoyment of the land" and providing examples of the "different 
ways and combinations of ways" in which this interest may be invaded). 
118 Another important imaginative device of rationality is metonymy. Whereas 
metaphor is a matter of understanding one concept or entity in terms of another con-
cept, metonymic reasoning entails one entity standingforanother. In the expression, 
"all hands on deck," for instance, the hand stands for the whole sailor. LAKOFF & 
joHNSON, supra note 35, at 35-40. In the same way, unprivileged entry in the form of 
objects, projectiles, wandering animals, and so forth under the indirect trespasser's 
control constitute trespass. See STOEBVCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 411 and 
accompanying notes. 
119 This is not intended as a casual use of the term, "category," rather, we use it in 
the experientialist sense. On the experientialist account, categories are conceptual, 
as distinguished from the common objectivist view of categories as naturally occur-
ring, independent of human conceptual categories. LAKOFF, supra note 19, at 266-68. 
For the objectivist, by contrast, categories are defined by the inherent properties of 
their members and are mind-independent. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying 
text. 
120 See supra note 116. 
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objects as nuisance-creating agents. 121 Much turns on whether the ob-
ject or objects are visible to the naked eye.I22 
lf the agents of nuisance, unlike trespass, do not disturb posses-
sion, private nuisance is nevertheless a tort against interests initially 
associated with property ownership.123 Traditionally, the interest in-
vaded has been deemed to be the "use and enjoyment" of the land by 
the possessor;124 although providing a workable definition of "use and 
enjoyment"125 (and particularly to do so in terms of property126) has 
proved to be a challenge. The point to be taken is that the parame-
ters of common law nuisance are not especially well delineated in ap-
121 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 412. The distinction be-
tween nuisance and trespass based on the size of the instrumentality involved may 
seem arbitrary or frivolous at first glance; however, on understanding nuisance and 
trespass as conceptual categories, it becomes perfectly sensible. The prototype of the 
conceptual category "trespass" is physical intrusion of the trespasser's person. !d. 
§ 7.1, at 411. The metaphor, "objects are extensions of the person manipulating 
them," admits direct physical intrusion in the form of some instrumentality wielded 
by the trespasser into the category, trespass. Intrusion in the form of objects with 
insignificant mass is too remote from the central category prototype for category 
membership. 
122 Dust, insects, and even smoke occupy physical space and have substance, how-
ever inconsequential, but these are generally regarded as nuisance-causing agents, 
not instruments of trespass. KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 71. 
123 Ownership interests protected from private nuisance include interests less than 
fee absolute ownership. For instance, tenants for a term, mortgagors in possession 
after a foreclosure, even those in adverse possession enjoy interests recognized as pro-
tected from nuisance. Id. at 621. 
124 This does not, however, define public nuisance, which requires no injury to 
real property; instead, public nuisance and private actions for public nuisance arise 
on injury to public rights, though such rights might include an injury to real property. 
See generally Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 
89,96 (1998) ("The public nuisance action stems from the injury a private use inflicts 
on public rights, which may occasionally mean harm to real property owned by the 
public, but is more often an injury to common pool resources .... "). 
125 According to the Second Restatement of Torts: 
"Interest in use and enjoyment" also comprehends the pleasure, comfort 
and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land. 
Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as impor-
tant to a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or free-
dom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 821D cmt. b (1979). 
126 SToEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.2, at 416 ("How should we define the 
property interest that the law of nuisance protects? Is it necessary to say that the 
plaintiff has a specifically defined property interest in light, air, and view, as discrete 
kinds of 'property,' or should we define the protected property interest more broadly 
as use and e~oyment of the land?"). 
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plication. 127 The formula for stating the action, however, is quite 
clear,128 and, more important for present purposes, there is little con-
fusion about the essence of nuisance law, which is to address uses of 
property that itljure the interests of another or a community of others. 
The conceptual history of nuisance law begins with the Black-
stonian conception ofproperty.129 It corresponds roughly to contem-
porary popularly held conceptions of property, I so which equate 
property to things, land, or personalty, actually owned.131 This concep--
tion has, however, always been inadequate for law, which generally 
regards property as describing a relationship between the owner and 
the things themselves. In other words, things are not property, rather, 
things are merely the subjects of property. 132 
In any case, Blackstone described property to be "sole and des-
potic dominion whicl. one man claims and exercises over external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ-
127 KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 549-50. 
128 According to the Restatement, "[a] private nuisance is a non-trespassory inva-
sion of another's interest in the private use and e~oyment of land.w REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). First, there must be some intentional conduct 
that amounts to interference with the use and enjoyment of land. !d. § 822. 
The phrase "interest in the use and enjoyment of land" is used ... [by the) 
Restatement in a broad sense. It comprehends not only the interests that a 
person may have in the actual present use of land for residential, agricul-
tural, commercial, industrial and other purposes, but also his interests in 
having the present use value of the land unimpaired by changes in its physi-
cal condition. 
!d. § 821D cmt. b. Second, there must, indeed, be a resulting interference from that 
conduct. !d. § 821F. Third, the interference must result in harm (significantly, the 
requirement is satisfied on showing a devaluation of the nuisance victim's property). 
!d. § 826. Finally, the interference must be unreasonable. ld. 
129 See supra text accompanying note 95. 
130 BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, PruvATE PRoPERTY AND THE CoNsTITUTION 97-100, 113-67 
(1977). This is the lay notion of property ownership as dominion over things. 
131 See, e.g., Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in the Law, 86 U. 
PA. L. REv. 691, 691 (1938) ("A layman thinks of property as a man's belongings, or as 
the things that a man owns."). The fact is, the "layman" conceives of property in terms 
of objects or things not because the layman is insipid, but because that conception is 
perfectly serviceable for the layman's purposes. !d. at 694-95. One might spend a 
highly successful lifetime acting in every regard on a concept of the universe that 
supposes the sun revolves around the earth like a ball on a string. In the course of the 
day for most of us, that conception is as serviceable as any other. A different concep-
tualization is required only when the other fails to accommodate the endeavor at 
hand. See id. at 696 ("Changing culture causes the law to speak with new imperatives, 
invigorates some concepts, devitalizes and brings to obsolescence others."). 
132 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 1.1, at 1. 
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ual . "133 Blackstonian notions of unitary ownership of land, with 
all of its domineering political associations, implied an equally potent 
corollary: "[A]bsolute dominion ... conferred on an owner the power 
to prevent any use of his neighbor's land that conflicted with his own 
quiet enjoyment." 134 Of course, stated in the negative, the same prin-
ciple meant circumscribing the rights of owners to develop or use 
their land in contradiction of the principle of absolute dominion. 135 
In an economy centered on land ownership, that contradiction 
presented relatively few actual conflicts.136 Direct invasion was dealt 
with by trespass, and obnoxious uses short of invasion that interfered 
with quiet enjoyment were circumscribed as nuisances. 137 Nine-
teenth-century economic developments, however, meant novel and 
expanding uses of land that began to produce more nettlesome con-
flicts. 138 Gradually, the contradiction between corresponding rights 
and obligations of property ownership was not only exposed, but 
brought to highly problematic relief. The indirect invasion that nec-
essarily attended novel uses were, of course, instantly met with the law 
of nuisance, which proscribed strictly any interference with use and 
enjoyment. Strict liability for nuisance meant the costs of remedying 
133 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at *2. 
134 MORTON J. HoRWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 
31 (1997) (footnotes omitted). For Blackstone, property owners had to desist from 
even lawful uses that offended the use and enjoyment of neighboring owners, upon 
whom "it is incumbent ... to find some other place to do that act, where it will be less 
offensive." Id. (quoting 2 BLAcKSTONE, supra note 112, at *217-18). According to 
Vandevelde, the two essential components of Blackstone's conception were the pres-
ence of a physical thing, which might be the object of property, and the notion that 
ownership of that thing was exclusive and absolute. Vandevelde, supra note 25, at 
331. 
135 It is a matter of the "entitlement to make noise versus the entitlement to have 
silence, the entitlement to pollute versus the entitlement to breathe clean air." Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1090-91 (1972). 
136 See Halper, supra note 124, at 101 ("While there may be cross-boundary annoy-
ances, in an agrarian economy, where land is wealth, not many land uses conflict. 
Those that do can be subjected to an 'act at your peril' rule of strict liability, without 
much damage to the economy." (footnotes omitted)). 
137 !d. at 100. 
138 As professor Halper explains: 
[N]ew kinds of active uses, dynamic, voracious and large-scale, came to swal-
low up land and people. Those uses often, virtually always, conflicted with 
the old ones. They involved speed and machinery and emissions and smells 
and discharges and noise and steam and the plethora of other "less salubri-
ous consequences" of industrial and extractive enterprises. 
Id. at 101 (footnotes omitted). 
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the injury had to be internalized in derogation of profits, and so also 
in derogation of development. 139 
It quickly became apparent that common law nuisance doctrine 
was antithetical to late nineteenth-century industrial growth and ex-
pansion. 140 The prognosis for nuisance was clear-to begin with, 
strict liability had to go141 and negligence would, to some degree, take 
is place. 142 
What, then, of nuisance as a symbol of egalitarian creed-the 
idea that property is "qualitatively identical among property owners 
regardless of the owner's birth, character, wealth, creed or ideol-
ogy ... "?143 The erosion of nuisance entailed a simultaneous erosion 
of the sacred institution of property, and so threatened the egalitarian 
ideology it signified. While courts were unwilling to go so far as to 
139 ld. at 103; see also David Abraham, Liberty and Property: Lard Bramwell and the 
Political Economy of Liberal Jurisprudence, Individualism, Freedom, and Utility, 38 AM. J. 
LEGAL HisT. 288, 297-98 (1994) (describing strict liability as essentially a dead weight 
on industrial development). 
140 In short, utilitarian principles would prevail through one means or another. 
Essentially, solitary or small-scale landholders asserting their Blackstonian ownership 
in an endeavor to halt offensive neighboring uses were either denied recovery or 
limited to damages. The cost of maintaining the Blackstonian notion of absolute do-
minion, to include freedom from offensive uses by one's neighbor, was too high. 
That is to say, large-scale, economically attractive activities reasonably conducted 
would not, in the end, be compelled to internalize the cost of preserving Blackstonian 
property concepts. The late-eighteenth-century Mill Acts dramatically illustrate the 
point. HoROWITZ, supra note 134, at 47-53. To encourage the building of mills, a 
num her of states passed acts that foreclosed trespass and nuisance to landowners com-
plaining of their lands being flooded by neighboring mills. ld. at 47-48. Generally, 
these acts would effectively eliminate the customary action for trespass and nuisance: 
punitive damages, permanent i~unction, and self-help abatement. Id. at 48. The 
Mill Acts represent "some of the earliest illustrations of American willingness to sacri-
fice the sanctity of private property in the interest of promoting economic develop-
ment." ld. at 47. 
141 The impact on development from nuisance doctrine was also ameliorated by 
denying injunctive relief in favor of damages. The remedy was determined by balanc-
ing the equities, i.e., balancing the harm to the complaining party as against the social 
utility of the injury-causing activity. SToEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.2, at 
418-19. This was the "American Rule" from early on. Halper, supra note 124, at 
109-13. 
142 See Robert G. Bone, Narmative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance 
Law: 1830 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1139 (1986) ("To mid-nineteenth-century 
conceptualists, negligence-based nuisance doctrine held out the hope of assimilating 
nuisance law to the prevailing fault theory of tort liability. The doctrine imposed 
liability for most land uses only if the defendant negligently conducted the use."). 
Deficiencies in negligence-based nuisance doctrine, however, prevented it from be-
coming firmly entrenched in nuisance law. ld. at 1146. 
143 Halper, supra note 124, at 104. 
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deprive nuisance doctrine of its property heritage, 144 nevertheless the 
conception of property as connoting absolute dominion, compre-
hending freedom from offending uses by neighboring property own-
ers, was simply incompatible with industrial development. 
The transformation from agrarian to industrial economy also saw 
erosion of the political and economic importance of solitary owner-
ship of land. Unitary ownership of anything was exploded into frag-
mented rights and relations by Hohfeld. 145 These could be divided 
and subdivided, distributed and redistributed, or "even made to disap-
pear as if by magic .... "146 
Moreover, the very definition of property, theretofore securely 
anchored in inherited associations with land or other things, was 
forced from its object-ownership moorings.I47 The legal category 
"property" was suddenly pressed into service to govern an array of in-
corporeal rights and interests which supplanted land in economic sig-
nificance in an industrial, capitalistic economy. 148 The universe of 
property expanded enormously to the degree that some observers 
144 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 74 (1979) (discussing the weakness of utilitarian consid-
erations in failing to explicitly recogni!-e antecedent or natural rights that the law was 
not called upon to create). 
145 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning II, in FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN juDICIAL REASoNING AND 
OTHER LEGAL EssAYS 65, 67 (Walter W. Cooked., 1923). It might be more accurate to 
say Hohfeld chronicled the explosion rather than precipitated it. Professor Jeanne 
Schroeder, who offers an extended treatment of the bundle of sticks metaphor, de-
clares that on unveiling his bundle analysis, Hohfeld wrote the epitaph commemorat-
ing the already dead "ancestral" concept of property. Schroeder, Bundle-0-Stix, supra 
note 64, at 239-40. Hohfeld's familiar recharacterization of property as a set of legal 
relations, together with A.M. Honore's contributions to the bundle of rights model, 
are analyzed and critiqued in J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 
UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996). 
146 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NoMOS XXII: PRoPERTY, 69, 
69-70 Q. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
147 See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CoRNELL 
L. REv. 531, 536 (2005) (discussing early, value-based views on property and the ab-
sence of such views from modern theory). 
148 These are the "capitalized assets" that are the hallmark of a modern industrial 
market-stock ownership, copyrights, patents, good will and the like. Morris R. Co-
hen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CoRNEaL. REv. 8, 12 (1927). Grey observes: 
The transformation of a preindustrial economy of private proprietors 
into an industrial economy ... presupposes that the entrepreneurs, finan-
ciers, and lawyers who carry the process through have the imagination to 
liberate themselves from the imprisoning concept of property as the simple 
ownership of a thing by an individual person. They must be able to design 
new forms of finance and control for enterprise, which can take maximum 
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predicted that virtually every interest or right threatened to lay claim 
to that status, diluting the concept to the point of meaninglessness. 149 
The emergent bundle metaphor defined property without con-
ceptual reference to unitary control and dominion over things. It de-
scribed a set of self-sufficient rights and usages no different, perhaps, 
from other legal rights. When property law principles are indistin-
guishable from those of other doctrinal systems, it seems to deprive 
property of the status of a distinct legal category. 
The perceived disintegration of property into a bundle of sticks, 
with its potential for fragmented ownership, might also be said to 
render the general concept of ownership meaningless. Where sticks 
are held by several, who is the owner? What is more, if the concept of 
property requires no reference to a physical thing owned, the way is 
clear to declare anything of value to be property. Then again, if every-
thing is property or can be the subject of property, then, perhaps 
nothing is property and property ceases to be an important legal 
category.150 
However that may be, the report of the death of property was 
premature.151 As a legal category, property has by no means lost its 
power to decide disputes and it does so with mundane regularity. The 
oppressive property priority awarded secured claims offers a stunning 
example. Under a proposition-based program which resolves legal is-
advantage of ... forms that fractionate traditional ownership and that create 
claims remote from tangible objects. 
Grey, supra note 146, at 75-76. 
149 "The protection of value rather than things ... greatly broadened the purview 
of property law. Any valuable interest potentially could be declared the object of 
property rights. This ... was a development that threatened to place the entire 
corpus of American law in the category of property." Vandevelde, supra note 25, at 
329. 
150 In Thomas Grey's words, "[w)e have gone ... in less than two centuries, from a 
world in which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly understood institution 
to one in which it is no longer a coherent or crucial category in our conceptual 
scheme. The concept of property and the institution of property have disintegrated." 
Grey, supra note 146, at 74. 
151 "[P]roperty as an economic and legal practice continues to flourish. Property 
concepts have not come crashing down in the face of this arcane, arid, and acontex-
tuallegal argument. The Hohfeldian approach refuses to analyze contemporary prop-
erty qua property on the grounds that property is dead as an analytical category. The 
marketplace, however, needs to account for property and continues to build the pro-
tective belt of auxiliaries." Schroeder, Bundle-0-Stix, supra note 64, at 300; see also Bell 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 531 (suggesting that the "bundle of sticks" meta-
phor is obsolete and proposing a unified theory of property predicated on the insight 
that property law is organized around creating and defending the value inherent in 
stable ownership). 
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sues by recourse to conventional categories, to designate an interest 
property is not a thing to be taken lightly. 152 
Likewise, then, nuisance doctrine remains intact as well. To be 
sure, breasting the winds of changing conceptions of property cer-
tainly left a different nuisance doctrine than that which absolutely 
protected land ownership. But if the right to use and enjoyment of 
property without interference no longer enjoys its former absolute do-
minion and glory, nuisance remains a property watchdog and its ap-
plication to security conceived as property is where we turn attention 
next. 
IV. NUisANcE DocTRINE AS A RuBRic To CoNSTRAIN THE MrsusE OF 
SECURED CREDIT-PUTTING A STOP TO JUDGMENT-PROOFING 
For present purposes, we are neither challenging the prevailing 
property model nor proposing an alternative conceptualization of se-
curity.153 What we would argue is only that if all of the dimensions of 
the now accepted source concept "property" are imprinted on the tar-
get concept "security," there is ample justification to warrant limiting 
the secured creditor's legal rights (and remedies) when the exercise 
of those rights, understood as property rights, interfere unreasonably 
with the competing rights of a community of others-that is to say, 
when the security interest becomes a nuisance. Put another way, the 
rights of secured creditors as property owners should not exceed unqual-
ifiedly the rights of other property owners in the fashion that the pri-
ority rules of Article 9, operating in isolation, would demand. 
1\$ we have pointed out in the previous Part, the protection of 
property rights, while expansive, is not absolute. In the real property 
context, when the use of one's property interferes with the reasonable 
e~oyment of adjacent property, nuisance law can be invoked to con-
strain the offending use (i.e., to limit the otherwise unfettered rights 
152 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
153 This is something we have, however, done in the past, at least in the context of 
a bankruptcy proceeding. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2289-96. 
Once it is recognized that the security interest is not a thing that is prvperty, but rather 
represents a dynamic relationship that for some purposes we have come to under-
stand conceptually through the prism of the property metaphor, we (and more im-
portantly courts) are no longer consigned irrevocably to understand the security 
interest as property, with all of the entailments associated with that concept, for all 
purposes. In essence, then, we are freed to bring to bear competing conceptualiza-
tions that more accurately, and more fairly, characterize the relationship between the 
debtor, the secured party, and others with a cognizable economic stake in that rela-
tionship. Although a tantalizing prospect, our assertion in this Article is far less in-
trepid than that. 
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of ownership). Analogically, the same methodology cannot only be 
applied to an Article 9 property interest, but we would maintain needs 
to be so employed in order to reconcile appropriately these rights 
with the rights of other claimants in and to the same property. Thus, 
the question becomes when does the Article 9 security interest, and 
the benefits of the prioritization entitlements it enjoys, impinge on 
other interests in the credit community to the point that the security 
interest becomes a nuisance from the broader perspective of aggre-
gate social utility? In other words, to say that secured credit is benefi-
cial to the well being of the commercial order is meaningless unless 
and until the limits on the truth of that assertion are explored. 
The ideation of security as property in Article 9 did not render 
wholly irrelevant the application of other, non-Code doctrines, which, 
proceeding from the property model, might be pressed into service to 
alter this result in extraordinary cases. There is, further, a pragmatic 
as well as a normative value in harmonizing application of these doc-
trines with the concept of the security interest as property, and it is 
here that we believe the nuisance metaphor-itself a species of prop-
erty law-may have something to say that is not only consonant with 
the prevailing positive law abstraction of security as property, but actu-
ally flows directly from it at the core conceptual level. 
We make no claim thatjudgment-proofing amounts to nuisance 
in the conventional sense. In addition, we advocate neither the ex-
pansion of the tort of nuisance generally to embrace injury to intangi-
ble interests in specific personalty by analogy, nor otherwise 
recommend the creation of a cause of action to limit use of personal 
property, including security in all cases. Rather, we believe simply that 
certain misuses of security, including most notably judgment-proof-
ing, belong in the conceptual category nuisance. We further maintain 
that there are good historical and contemporary reasons to put it 
there.154 Judgment-proofing has been indicted in the literature which 
describes its costs. 1ss What we offer here is a conceptual redux that 
assembles and restates those costs in a few recognizable, doctrinally 
stipulated terms. 
The experiment contributes to the discourse in two ways: First, 
the threats posed by judgment-proofing are gathered under relatively 
determinate markers that elicit widely familiar associations. 156 Sec-
154 See infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. 
156 The idea here is to disentangle judgment-proofing from the general debate 
over the worth of the institution of secured credit generally. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text (summarizing fairness and efficiency questions raised by secured 
credit). Judgment-proofing, nemo dat gone mad as we put it, is relocated for discrete 
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ond, distillation and consignment of judgment-proofing to the nui-
sance domain supplies a manageable doctrinal response to this 
practice and a remedial opportunity in more or less conventional 
bankruptcy (arguably non-conventional state) law terms. 157 In short, 
understandingjudgment-proofing in tenns of nuisance doctrine in ser-
vice of meaning introduces doctrinal demarcation and response man-
ageability through a simple heuristic structure. With that, we turn to 
our explication of nuisance as a conceptual category. 
There are doubtless a number of ways in which the conceptual 
category "nuisance" might be explained and described. 158 We believe, 
however, that among them, nuisance might usefully be understood as 
a radial category, just as we have suggested that the concept "prop-
erty" can be understood as a radial category. 159 Moreover, an account 
of nuisance as a radial category furnishes an explanatory perspective 
that sheds an illuminating glint to highlight our purposes in this Part. 
Specifically, it is our claim that judgment-proofing is likewise a con-
ceptually natural member of that radial category, and we propose 
therefore the application of nuisance tenets in that context to enable 
systematic decision response management. 
A single prototype or best example of the conceptual category 
nuisance is difficult to identifY, but none is required. Any of a num-
ber would do. Our own informal inquiries suggest one serviceable 
possibility, namely, the discharge of dust160 from one property for the 
landowner's recreational use which travels to neighboring property 
analysis on an abuse basis. Simply put, the injuries worked by judgment proofing are 
reassembled under the few household terms from nuisance. The nature of those 
threats is thus understood on conceptual grounds on which there is accord. 
157 The strategy is to provide decision makers an accessible, off-the-rack means of 
capturing and killing judgment-proofing schemes. Nuisance is long-standing and 
conceptually seasoned, and its essential mission largely a matter of agreement. See 
supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text. Nuisance doctrine is therefore readily 
and widely available to decision makers. 
158 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that cognitive linguistics has 
identified several conceptual category types). 
159 Space does not permit a rigorous discussion of nuisance as a radial category, 
but a detailed account is unnecessa1y for present purposes. The treatment of property 
as radial category offered in Part II.B should serve to demonstrate how the analysis 
proceeds. 
160 While our choice of a central case is based upon our informal survey of our 
colleagues, the factual instantiations in the cases are consistent with that choice and 
offer a wide array of examples. The one we selected seemed to spring irresistibly to 
the minds of most when asked to pick a best example. The other most common 
responses elicited on asking for a common or most common nuisance were: barking 
dogs, funeral homes, rank or obnoxious odors, smoke, and noise. Responses in-
cluded all, and they are easily elicited. 
2006] HAVING ONE'S PROPERTY AND EATING IT TOO 
and devalues it. The stories available in the case law suggest a host of 
related radial members, and also the point at which extension fails. 
They suggest as well some of the most salient features which define 
the prototype. 
Offending activity that produces substances short of dust or the 
like is, within both the conceptual and legal categories, nuisance. For 
instance, smoke is regarded as a nuisance-causing substance where it 
crosses property lines to disturb neighbors or devalue their prop-
erty.161 Considerable extension from the prototype is tolerated: 
odors, noise, and light have all been ruled agents of nuisance. 162 
Gases, odors, even noise and light, are not conceptually problem-
atic, or not seriously so-they are simply metaphoric extensions of 
dust or other substances. But other activities have been declared a 
nuisance within the legal category, though they produce nothing per-
ceptible, at the literal or nonliteral level that journeys to adjacent 
property. For instance, an undertaking business is a nuisance-causing 
activity, but produces nothing easily understood as crossing property 
lines. 163 That radial extension is obviously acceptable, from which we 
conclude sufficient resemblance to the category prototype. 
The implication may be that resemblance to the best case in that 
particular is essential neither for membership in the conceptual cate-
gory "nuisance" nor, for that matter, the conventional legal category. 
It may also be that, assuming enough resemblance to the prototype on 
other grounds, marginal resemblance by metaphoric extension will 
do. We believe two features or traits seem to identify the central case: 
first, the use of something one owns within sufficient proximity, liter-
ally or metaphorically, so as to it:Uure something belonging to an-
other.164 Second, there is no good reason for the offending use; that 
is, the good, if any, that is derived from the offending use is out-
weighed by the corresponding injury to neighboring interests. 165 
161 See Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207, 210 (Ga. 1919) (stat-
ing that smoke constitutes a nuisance when it "produce[s] a visible, tangible, and 
appreciable injury to property."). 
162 Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (stating 
that "[a]ll tangible intrusions, such as noise, odor, or light fall within the realm of 
nuisance"); see also supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (differentiating nui-
sance from trespass in conceptual terms). 
163 Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1958). 
164 The best example here may be pecuniary loss from visible, physical injury to 
land. See KEETON ET AL., supra note Ill, at 627. 
165 The balance schema is widely distributed across any array of concepts. For an 
account (and critique) of the balance schema in the law, where it becomes a special-
ized version of propositional reasoning, see joHNSON, supra note 36, at 90-96. 
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Turning to the relationship between certain uses of security and 
the category prototype, the "use of property" (derived from the dust-
creating activity in the central case) is shared by the deployment of 
security to judgment-proof at the literal level. In the case of the cate-
gory best example, the interest (land ownership) is sufficiently proxi-
mate (literally) to the place of the nuisance-creating conduct to be 
devalued by that conduct. The proximity of the secured creditor's 
unsecured creditor neighbors is easily established metaphorically. At 
the nonliteral level, the community of unsecured creditors is within 
injury-causing range of the security interest wielded to judgment-
proof the debtor. 166 The presence of an interest susceptible to injury 
is a feature shared at the literal level by the category prototype and the 
unsecured creditor, as is the devaluation of the interest. 167 
In the prototype we described for discussion purposes, the nui-
sance-causing conduct is recreational-it has value only to the party 
undertaking it. The same is easily said of secured credit employed as a 
judgment-proofing scheme-the correspondence is likely literal. It 
would prove difficult, indeed, to find an argument claiming judg-
ment-proofing is of value to anyone save the secured party and, per-
haps, the debtor's current managers. 168 With the aggregate utility of 
secured credit generally still very much debated, 169 the use of secured 
credit to judgment-proof at the expense of unsecured creditors seems 
difficult to justify on any commercially rational, let alone equitable, 
basis. Indeed, once the risk of firm failure has been entirely external-
ized, the incentives and controls that promote prudent business deci-
sion making are eschewed, and in their place is substituted a set of 
stimuli and inducements that encourage decisions favoring the taking 
166 The rights of unsecured creditors are within the sphere of influence, if you 
will, of the secured claim. The unsecured creditors, it might be said, are the financial 
neighbors of the secured creditor. The proximity is, of course, nonliteral. 
167 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (pointing out that the rights of judg-
ment creditors are worthless where the debtor is judgment proof). The money judg-
ment, standing alone, might be described as little more than official 
acknowledgement by the authority issuing it that the creditor's case for liability, 
whether based on contract or tort, is made. That is not to say, on the other hand, that 
a case might not be made for regarding in some sense the rights of unsecured credi-
tors as representing a property right, or ·at least a nascent property right. See infra text 
accompanying notes 173-74. 
168 LoPucki, supra note 11, at 14-30 (suggesting how the debtor may benefit from 
judgment-proofing schemes); see also supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing judgment-proofing strategies). 
169 See supra notes 7-8. 
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of risk wholly disproportionate to any reasonable assessment of poten-
tial return. 170 
If we hypothesize a borrower that, because of the nature of its 
current and historic business operations, faces a serious risk of insol-
vency due to, for example, contingent and unliquidated tort liability 
(e.g., a tobacco company), one sees the beginnings of an argument 
that the system of prioritization in favor of the firm's secured lenders 
might operate as an unreasonable interference (i.e. a nuisance-caus-
ing event) with the property rights of its unsecured creditors who have 
no real or practical opportunity to bargain for the same advantage. 
When this occurs, some limitation of full priority, or perhaps another 
other remedy, such as alter ego liability to pull more assets into reach, 
may be called for under suppletory doctrines such as the notion of 
enterprise liability in the case of artificially fractured corporate struc-
tures171 or fraudulent transfer law where the leveraging through se-
cured financing has left the firm with unreasonably small capital.172 
We take this question up in Part V below, but, first, a threshold inquiry 
needs to be addressed: namely, are "property" interests being invaded 
at all when the nature of the prejudiced claims is purely contractual in 
nature? 
We believe the answer is clearly "yes," justified on one of two ba-
ses. First, while perhaps purely nascent in form, the right of un-
secured creditors to reduce their cla;.ms to judgment and secure or 
satisfy those judgments through execution on the debtor's property is 
intrinsically and notionally no less a "property" right than the secured 
creditor's claim to future property, which is and always has been 
clearly recognized in Article 9.173 Second, were the same rights as-
signed to secured creditors they would most certainly be classified as 
personal property collateral within the scope of Article 9. Indeed, Ar-
ticle 9 is itself largely an exercise in the classification of things, the 
most basic of which is the first inquiry undertaken to determine 
whether the collateral is real estate. If not, and not otherwise ex-
cluded, the property, and the taking of an interest in the property, is 
subject to Article 9.174 Stated another way, if the rights of such credi-
tors were hypothecated, the drafters had no qualms about including 
170 See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
171 See, e.g., Katherine D. Kale, Securitizing the Enterprise: Enterprise Liability and 
Transferred Receivables in Bankruptcy, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 311, 314 (2003) (discussing "the 
possibility of imposing enterprise liability through agency principles in order to draw 
transferred receivables back into the estate of the bankrupt parent corporation"). 
172 See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
173 u.c.c. § 9-204 (2006). 
174 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
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them in the taxonomy of personalty and declaring the interest con-
veyed an Article 9 security interest. Logically, if such rights can be 
regarded as property after they are hypothecated, then surely they 
must also be so before the interest actually arises. 
The predicate for designating a judgment-proofing scheme as a 
species of the conceptual category nuisance derives from Grant Gil-
more's original observation that security was never designed to permit 
borrowers to hypothecate "all that they may ever own in the indefinite 
future" to a creditor willing to make a loan that, in light of the risks 
entailed, should probably never have been made in the first place.175 
Stated another way, there must be some limiting considerations on 
the ability of debtors to overleverage simply because creditors can 
overcollateralize. 176 Moreover, the fallout (and bankruptcy bailouts) 
witnessed in the wake of the leverage buyout exuberance of the late 
1980s is a telling reminder that we cannot count on the discipline of 
the market alone to control such excesses.177 Indeed, had the princi-
pals in those transactions known that they might have to bear the risks 
and costs associated with their highly speculative investment decisions, 
175 1 GILMORE, supra note 4, §7.12, at 248-49. This observation also formed the 
basis for the Warren carve-out proposal. See Warren, supra note 16, at 324 (citing 
Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confes-
sions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 627 (1981)). 
176 Warren, supra note 16, at 323-34. A more elegant solution, if for no other 
reason than that it would have constrained the misuse of secured credit within the 
four corners of Article 9 itself, the carve-out proposal went nowhere with the Revised 
Article 9 Drafting Committee because of the committee's blind allegiance to the 
property/ conveyance model of security. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying 
text. The assignment of security to the category "property," understanding that cate-
gory in a conventional rather than a radial or other metaphoric sense, might be la-
mented, but it cannot be ignored. Our proposal differs then from the carve-out 
proposal less in substance and more in approach, as we suggest a rubric for taming 
the worst abuses of security within the contours of the prevailing property model. 
177 See generally Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasona-
ble Risk, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1165, 1180 (1995) (discussing the "inherently risky" nature of 
leveraged buyouts). In this classic analysis of the application of fraudulent transfer 
law to LBO transactions, Professor Zaretsky pointed out that an LBO lender would 
often receive collateral as well as a high interest rate and substantial fees. Id. at 1192. 
The risk that this senior collateralized lender would not be repaid was, thus, relatively 
small, while the potential profits loomed large. This created an incentive to pursue a 
transaction even if there was a relatively high risk of failure. At the same time, how-
ever, from the perspective of non LBO creditors, who before the transaction stood to 
be repaid in full, the loss upon failure of the enterprise was likely to be substantial 
without the corresponding potential reward in the event of success. The act of judg-
ment-proofmg a debtor through the issuance of secured debt produces precisely the 
same risk/reward premium for the secured lender and risk/reward penalty for un-
secured lenders. Id. 
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it is unlikely that the credit that fueled many of those transactions 
would have been available in the first place. 
It is our contention that when full priority rules result in a trans-
fer of value from unsecured creditors to secured creditors, which in 
itself we suppose is neither good nor bad, enforcement of these rules 
warrant greater scrutiny. Specifically, when this result occurs in any 
given situation, the appropriate inquiry is not only whether the phe-
nomenon is theoretically defensible in terms of net social savings or 
utility, but also whether it is defensible in the context of fairness inter 
se among the parties involved in the transactional dynamics in which 
it occurs. It is in this regard that we have suggested that it is not de-
fensible when the all-encompassing security interest has been em-
ployed by corporate managers of a distressed entity to leverage the 
debtor firm to levels that exceed the liquidation value of the firm and, 
thereby, allow management and the principal financer to ignore the 
reasonable risks of business failure. 
Invariably, this occurs when all of the debtor's available assets 
have been hypothecated as collateral; that is, security becomes not 
simply-as intended-a vehicle to assure repayment of a debt, but 
rather a mechanism for shifting the entire risk of firm collapse to un-
secured creditors. In other words, when security becomes a license to 
gamble with "other people's money,"178 the form has been used to 
perpetrate a wrong that cries for a remedy, or, to call into service the 
property-based concepts we discussed earlier, the perverse incentives 
facilitated by full credit prioritization have become a nuisance.179 
Moreover, when the debtor, or debtor's management, has lost any 
raison d'etre to seek the long-term interests of the firm by taking ap-
propriate steps to operate with both reasonable care and ordinary bus-
178 By "other people's money," we mean specifically, the services and supplies pro-
vided by general unsecured creditors and the value to which tort victims would other-
wise have been entitled in compensation for their injuries. See Shavell, supra note 
102, at 45 ("An injurer will treat liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effec-
tive financial penalty only equal to his assets; an injurer with assets of $30,000, for 
example, will treat an accident resulting in liability of $100 000 identically with an 
accident resulting in liability of only $30 000. "). 
179 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 602-03 (advocating that nuisance 
theory should be recast and expanded from one that focuses on interference with 
"use and ef!Joyment" to one that regulates directly against uses of property that impair 
the value of adjacent property owners). This approach to nuisance is even more di-
rectly apposite to our argument inasmuch as secured claims by definition appropriate 
value from unsecured claims. While we do not assert that this a basis for interference 
with the Article 9 priority rules in every case, we could maintain that it becomes so 
when the effect is to appropriate all value and, in so doing, leave unsecured creditors 
exposed to unreasonable risks that would not otherwise exist. 
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iness prudence,180 and the secured creditor has no incentive to 
constrain these tendencies, 181 arguments based on the supposed effi-
ciency of secured credit become rather feeble and attenuated. 
The 1998 amendments to Article 9 which eliminated virtually all 
exclusions of the types of personal property in which a valid security 
interest can be granted, and married that expansion in scope with a 
very successful undertaking to make the taking of security "as easy, 
inexpensive, and reliable as possible,"182 have exacerbated the likeli-
hood that judgment-proofing behavior will occur. If the company, 
succumbing to the temptations created by that condition, then fails 
because the "gamble" doesn't pay off, two consequences follow: (1) 
the debtor likely will lack the liquidity necessary to effectuate a suc-
cessful reorganization, and (2) on liquidation, or even in the rare case 
where the debtor is able to emerge from Chapter 11, the secured debt 
will exceed the value of the collateral, thereby effectively eliminating 
all liability except to the secured creditor, whose claim will be equal to 
or exceed the value of the reorganized debtor or its remaining assets, 
as the case may be. 
In our view, the use of secured credit to judgment-proof the 
debtor is a striking example of the radial category nuisance. The re-
semblance to the prototype through shared features on what we re-
gard to be natural extension is instantly recognizable.183 To put it 
bluntly, the use of security to judgment-proof injures the community 
of one's unsecured neighbors and benefits no one but the secured 
party184-it stinks of nuisance. Our thesis, then, is that the security 
interest either becomes a nuisance, or at least merits greater scrutiny 
as potentially constituting a nuisance, when the debtor has encum-
180 See generallyAlet:a G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for 
the Long Term, 45 RuTGERS L. REv. 513 (1993) (discussing the differing interests and 
motivatations of shareholders and non-shareholder managers of public companies 
from the perspective of the long-term economic best interest of the firm). 
181 See Note, supra note 107, at 2254-55 (explaining that secured creditors lose 
the incentive to monitor anything other than the value of their collateral, including 
managerial decisions regarding investments and risk, when they do not bear the costs 
of those risks). 
182 Carl S. Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues Under Re-
vised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. LJ. 261, 307 n.219 (1999) (quoting Harris & Mooney, 
supra note 2, at 2021 (1994)). 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 166-68. 
184 Bear in mind that the supposed "benefit" to the secured creditor is also some-
what ephemeral if the blanket lien on all assets is substituted for an informed credit 
decision. See Note, supra note 107, at 2555. Indeed, all creditors, including secured 
creditors, are better off if the firm t:akes appropriate precautions to manage the rea-
sonable risks of conducting its business. 
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bered all or most of its assets with no provision, such as insurance, for 
internalizing the reasonably foreseeable risks of its operations. Identi-
fication of these circumstances post hoc is a relatively easy matter com-
pared to identification ex ante, but this is a task in which courts 
routinely engage; for example, in application of fraudulent transfer 
law-both in and out of a bankruptcy situation. 185 
Theoretically, of course, the incurring of secured debt should 
never alone cause this circumstance to occur, unless the amount of 
the actual debt secured is artificially inflated to deliberately mislead 
unsecured creditors, inasmuch as the assets encumbered are simply 
traded for the proceeds of the secured loan. That is, the balance 
sheet is altered in composition but overall net worth is unaffected.186 
But where the debtor is financially unstable and at risk of investing the 
loan proceeds ill advisedly, a situation more likely to be present in all-
asset financing cases simply because the secured lender had the lever-
age to negotiate such draconian terms as a condition of the credit in 
the first place, 187 the externalization of risk to all but the secured 
lender is inevitable. Indeed, both the Bankruptcy Code and the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Law recognize as a constructively fraudu-
lent transfer one that leaves the debtor with unreasonably small 
185 See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. 
186 This argument has also been raised in response to criticisms of securitizations 
and other forms of structured financing transactions as judgment-proofing schema, 
namely, that in these deals, assets of one kind are simply exchanged for assets of 
another kind in an arm's-length transaction. That is to say, the originator will receive 
proceeds equal in value to the assets sold, thus not diminishing the value of the origi-
nator's estate. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 12-16 (arguing that only if the 
originator disposes of the proceeds is there judgment-proofing; securitization in and 
of itself is not a judgment-proofing technique). One response to Schwarcz's argu-
ment is that securitization, while not itself sufficient to judgment-proof a firm, is a 
useful component of a judgment-proofing technique: first securitize, then distribute 
the proceeds to claimants. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of judgment Proof 
ing: A Reply toProfessorSchwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55,59 (1999). The same logic applies 
in the case of secured loans. See infra note 187. 
187 In the case of larger companies, where there is a separation of ownership and 
management, agency issues further elevate the risk of imprudent use of the funds 
because of management's personal incentive to make high payoff, but high risk, in-
vestments that may not be in the long-term best interests of the company. See supra 
note 108 and accompanying text. This is particularly so if the borrower firm was ex-
periencing financial difficulties to begin with, which, in turn, is precisely the kind of 
situation in which secured lenders will have the motivation and the leverage to effec-
tively encumber all the debtor owns. 
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capital in relation to actual or anticipated business activities in which 
the debtor is currently engaged or plans to engage.188 
Of course, to sustain the fraudulent transfer analogy, the assets 
remaining after the security transfer must not only be unreasonably 
small, but what was returned to the debtor in exchange for the secur-
ity interest must be of less than reasonable economic equivalence. 189 
This can be difficult to establish under a pure fraudulent transfer 
analysis, as evidenced by cases willing to indulge the fiction of equiva-
lence even in the situation where the value goes to a third party, such 
as redeemed shareholders or a seller-corporation in the leveraged 
buyout scenario.l go 
It is at this juncture that we believe the nuisance analysis has a 
great deal to offer in providing a counterweight to the opportunities 
for mischief created by Revised Article 9's vast expansion of and defer-
ence to secured credit. This is not to suggest by any stretch of the 
imagination that every extension of secured debt is nefarious, or even 
that the value judgments made by the drafters relative to the correla-
tion between the good of the economy and the relaxing of most re-
straints on secured financing were wrong. It is only to recognize that, 
at the same time, the confluence of limited liability and the expansion 
of secured debt has created the potential for abuse which, under the 
current doctrinal scheme, has no natural predator-a bad thing no 
less in the world of finance than in nature. 
Affordable credit, the shibboleth constantly trotted out in de-
fense of full priority, if a good thing to a point, is also not a "holy 
grail" to be pursued oblivious to collateral damage. The possibility 
that, if abused, the privileges normally associated with the taking of 
security may be withdrawn through application of the nuisance model 
creates a powerful incentive for secured lenders to make more ra-
tional credit decisions then they have reason to make under the cur-
188 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(ii)(Il) (2000); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr 
§ 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999). Unlike "insolvency," "unreasonably small capital" 
is not defined by the UNIF. FRAUDLENT CoNVEYANCEs Acr §§ 2, 5, 7A U.L.A. 22-23, 
105 (1999). This has engendered confusion over the relationship between these con-
cepts: some courts have equated a finding of equitable insolvency (inability to pay 
debts as they come due) with that of unreasonably small capital. See, e.g., MFS/Sun 
Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 943 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). The better view, however, is that unreasonably small capital denotes 
a financial condition short of equitable insolvency. See Bruce A. Markell, Toward True 
and Plain Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 
21 IND. L. REv. 469, 498 (1988). 
189 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i). 
190 See, e.g., In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 1996); Mellon Bank, N.A. 
v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646--48 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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rent regime. And if that does increase the cost of credit in certain 
cases, then, again, we would submit that this cost is a fairer reflection 
of the internal risk of the transaction. 
In short, the ascendancy of the property-based account of security 
does not mean, or have to mean, that secured claims will always trump 
their unsecured counterparts. What we have tried in summary fashion 
to illustrate is that by approaching the categorization of security as 
property in metaphoric rather than conventional terms, while still re-
maining true to the core conceptual analogy (i.e., property), Article 9 
can be reconciled dynamically with the other legal systems and princi-
ples from which it cannot operate in isolation. These include, among 
others, property-based systems and principles designed to reconcile 
cross-boundary conflicts and, in this context, to promote distribu-
tional fairness. 
V. REMEDY 
If the security interest is determined to be a nuisance-an abuse 
of purposive intent and form-what is the appropriate remedial re-
sponse? The answer, we believe, already exists in the academic litera-
ture, and that is subordination to some extent of the secured party's 
legal entitlement to full priority. 191 Certainly we do not contend that 
every case where the debtor's assets are or become insufficient to sat-
isfy the totality of claims against the debtor is an appropriate case for 
loss of full priority. But when the debtor's assets are or become so 
inadequate as not to cover any claims save that of the secured lender, 
the predicate for examining a re-ordering of legal priorities becomes 
far more compelling. 
The largely academic debate over full versus partial priority 
largely occurred in the years and months leading up to the revision of 
Article 9; 192 and, in light of the provisions of the final approved, and 
now universally-adopted, version of the statute might seem a dead let-
191 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 8, at 905-06 (proposing subordination in 
bankruptcy of full priority in the case of nonconsensual creditors and other weekly 
adjusting or nonadjusting creditors); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, 
'The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a 
Reply to Critics, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1279, 1286-88 (1997) (arguing that full priority is 
inconsistent with the requirement of explicit consent to subordination); supra note 
106 (arguing that full priority to secured claims encourages firms to engage in riskier 
behavior than optimal because they do not internalize the cost of these risks). Other 
remedial responses to judgment-proofing accomplished through securitization have 
also been proposed. See authorities cited supra note 103. 
192 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Apporach to Valuing Se-
cured Claims in Bankrputcy, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2386 (2001 ); Warren, supra note 27. 
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ter. 193 This is of course another artifact of the triumph of the "secur-
ity interest as property" model, but it only needs be so if one takes a 
formalistic view of the statute rather than one that harmonizes its posi-
tive law provisions with its purposive objectives and applicable non-
Code doctrine. 
It is our contention, for the reasons previously stated, that the 
deliberate, or even improvident, judgment-proofing of the debtor by 
means of incurring secured debt in excess of the liquidation value of 
the firm's assets sets forth an example of when it may be appropriate 
to conceptualize the secured creditor's property interest as a nui-
sance. In tum, this should allow-wholly within the framework of the 
property metaphor that has come to dominate how security is under-
stood-for some limitation on the secured creditor's rights in relation 
to the parties victimized by the nuisance; i.e., unsecured creditors at 
whose expense the scheme was hatched. But what is the legal basis for 
reordering priority? Surely, it is not found in the four corners of Arti-
cle 9 itself, which has unconditionally embraced full priority. Moreo-
ver, because of the bankruptcy law's recognition and enforcement of 
the state law rights and interests that creditors bring with them into a 
federal bankruptcy proceeding, full priority of secured credit has be-
come a basic principle of bankruptcy as well. Although one could 
question fairly whether the imaginative associations entailed in the 
understanding of a security interest that pervade under state law nec-
essarily have to and should endure in the context of a collectivized 
proceeding, I 94 a more practical answer already exists. That answer be-
gins with the Bankruptcy Code itself, which codifies the bankruptcy 
courts' inherent statutory authority to invoke their equitable powers 
to subordinate for distribution purposes all or any part of an allowed 
claim.195 
As it has been interpreted by the courts, harking back to its ori-
gins in the Supreme Court's opinion in Pepper v. Litton,196 the doc-
193 See Warren, supra note 16, at 325; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying 
text (proposing a revision of Article 9 that would effectuate the set-aside proposal). 
194 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2289-96 (urging adoption of a 
value-based conceptualization of secured claims in bankruptcy as an alternative to the 
property-based account that pervades under state law based on a normative view of 
bankruptcy policy that recognizes the interests of noncreditor constituencies). 
195 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000). The purpose of the doctrine is to allow bankruptcy 
courts "to reprioritize the order of allowed claims based on the equities of the case, 
rather than to allow or disallow the claim in the first instance." Rafael Ignacio Pardo, 
Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity jurisprudence: N~rFault Equitable Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1489, 1490 (2000) (quoting In reCounty of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 559 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1997)). 
196 308 u.s. 295 (1939). 
2006) HAVING ONE'S PROPERTY AND EATING IT TOO 
trine of equitable subordination has generally, but not always, been 
predicated on some form of "creditor misconduct." 197 In this sense, 
equitable subordination has been understood to differ from fraudu-
lent transfer analysis, the latter having at its core a focus on the 
debtor's conduct (or misconduct, as the case may be). However, on 
two occasions in 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States, while 
rejecting any categorical subordination of claims in favor of a case-by-
case approach, declined to overrule several circuit court decisions ap-
plying a no-fault standard on a case-by-case basis. 198 In effect, the 
Court left intact at least three circuit court decisions ordering equita-
ble subordination in the absence of creditor misconduct in order to 
protect innocent creditors from misconduct by the debtor. 199 Thus, 
arguably, statutory authority for remediating a nuisance by adjusting 
the priority of claims in bankruptcy is already extant. The willingness 
of courts to do so, however, and the appropriateness of such action in 
the face of the general bias in bankruptcy to enforce state law entitle-
ments and enforce statutory priorities, would be open to serious ques-
tion in the absence of an analogous form of relief under applicable 
non bankruptcy law, which has been thought not to exist. That as-
sumption, however, has now been cast into considerable doubt. 
In an intriguing article, Professor David Gray Carlson has sug-
gested a basis for eschewing the metaphors that have dominated 
fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination, and in their 
place substituting a way of thinking about these areas of law that not 
only more accurately captures their underlying policy aims and practi-
cal implications, but that also recognizes an inherent kinship between 
the two doctrines.200 Specifically, Carlson observes that the meta-
phoric concepts that have traditionally come to structure these doc-
trines in commercial discourse-"avoidance" in the case of fraudulent 
transfers and "demotion" with respect to equitable subordination-
are the wrong concepts because, while they may produce serendip-
197 The case most frequently cited for this proposition is Be~amin v. Diamond (In 
re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977). 
198 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 228-29 
(1996); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996). 
199 Burden v. United States (In re Burden), 917 F.2d 115, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1990); In re 
Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1990). 
200 David G. Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subor-
dination, 45 WM. & MARv L. REv. 157 (2003). 
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itously the "right" result in many cases, they fail to produce the de-
sired result in marginal but no less important cases.201 
Professor Carlson's analysis shows that, in each instance, the rem-
edy is actually the same; namely, expropriation and transfer of specific 
property rights. 202 By replacing the concepts of "avoidance" and "sub-
ordination" with the single notion of transfer, Carlson convincingly 
demonstrates that commercial discourse is brought into "closer iden-
tity with its actual logical structure. "203 Under this approach, two 
seemingly inconsistent remedies, invoked in response to different mis-
deeds, are harmonized by the recognition that in either case what ac-
tually occurs is an assignment of one creditor's claim to those harmed 
by the inequitable conduct. 
The intuition that what actually transpires, whether the miscon-
duct is challenged under the fraudulent transfer law or the doctrine 
of equitable subordination, is transfer of specific property rights, ex-
poses an even more important insight for present purposes. That is, 
although ordinarily understood as a uniquely federal remedy, Carl-
son's research and analysis reveals that «equitable subordination is 
simply the fraudulent transfer remedy in disguise and that both reme-
dies can be considered to be within the competence of state law to 
achieve."204 In other words, equitable subordination, if essentially the 
fraudulent transfer law as applied in the context of a collective pro-
ceeding, must (despite frequent disavowal205 ) exist as part of the gen-
eral common law of the states, and Carlson makes a compelling case 
that it does. 206 
201 Jd. at 164-65 (noting that in the "average" case, the proper characterization of 
the remedy makes no practical difference, but that the concept of "avoidance" incor-
rectly implies a return of value to the debtor in the rare fraudulent transfer case 
where a surplus exists, and ~demotion" fails to adequately explain what transpires 
when subordination is to some but not all creditors). 
202 !d. at 165 ("What is really going on in all cases is a transfer of specific property 
rights.") 0 
203 Id. at 162. 
204 !d. at l 64. 
205 See id. at 163 n.l7 (citing 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp. v. Seminole Realty Co. 
(In re 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp.), 187 B.R. 837, 852-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); 
Greenfield v. Shuck, 867 F. Supp. 62, 70 (D. Mass. 1994); In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 163 
B.R. 411,413 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In rePoughkeepsie Hotel Assocs.JointVenture, 
132 B.R. 287, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Primex Plastics Corp. v. Lawrence Prods., 
Inc. No. 89 Civ. 2994 USM), 1991 WL 183367, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1991)). 
206 Carlson, supra note 200, at 218-19 (pointing to examples from New York and 
other states). Under Carlson's analysis, equitable subordination essentially works as 
an assignment of the claim of one creditor to the creditors harmed by the first credi-
tor's conduct. Id. at 200. So understood, it is functionally and analytically distinct 
from what occurs when a transfer is set aside or avoided as fraudulent. 
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The implications of this insight for remedying a nuisance-creat-
ing security interest are obvious. It affirms that courts, both in a bank-
ruptcy context and out, faced with a security transfer that abuses the 
form, have the power and authority to transfer back the value improp-
erly misappropriated from unsecured creditors by adjusting relative 
priorities. Moreover, this can be legitimately accomplished without 
disturbing the prevailing conceptualization of the security interest as 
property since, by definition, the transfer that is contemplated by the 
remedy is fundamentally a transfer recognized on long-standing prop-
erty concepts and doctrine. Historically, of course, the related princi-
ples of security of property and nemo dat-the debtor's ability to 
convey that which it owns and the rule of derivative title207-have al-
ways been limited by the law of fraudulent transfer which effectively 
proscribes certain property transfers perceived to prejudice unduly in-
nocent creditors.208 The effect of finding a particular transfer to fall 
within the categorical parameters of a fraudulent transfer is to require 
that the transferee return back that which was conveyed for the bene-
fit of the debtor's other creditors. All we are suggesting is that such a 
"transfer" can also be accomplished, when the misconduct consists of 
judgment-proofing through use of secured debt by ordering the 
whole or partial subordination of priority-thereby, resulting in, ef-
fectively, an abatement of the nuisance. 
The reordering of priorities in this manner in circumstances 
when all available assets have been conveyed to secure financing is not 
simply a mechanism to redress managerial excess or creditor miscon-
duct in specific instances where it occurs. The recognition of such a 
nuisance-like remedy should also, we believe, have a salutary in ter-
rorem effect in terms of promoting more control and discipline over 
excessive risk taking. In other words, if the combination of full prior-
ity and the corresponding bankruptcy rules which implement that 
principle fails to deter and even encourages judgment-proofing 
schema by facilitating the externalization of firm failure, then the ad-
justment of those legal rules to ensure that all creditors share in the 
risk of nonpayment should promote overall social utility.209 
207 See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544,550 (1872) ("No one in general 
can sell personal property and convey valid title to it unless he is the owner. ... Nemo 
dat quod non habet."). 
208 See, e.g., Sturtevant & Keep v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) 
("The law, in every period of its history has spoken a uniform language, and has al-
ways looked with great jealousy upon a sale or appropriation of goods, without parting 
with the possession, because it forms so easy and so fruitful a source of deception."). 
209 See Warren, supra note 27, at 1388 ("The ultimate question is not whether a 
partial priority scheme might cause some constriction in lending .... The real ques-
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Stated another way, abatement of the "nuisance" created by the 
only parties at the bargaining table-the debtor and the particular 
creditor advantaged by the scheme-by requiring the transfer back 
for unsecured creditors of some portion of that value upon firm fail-
ure would certainly result in a more equitable sharing of the loss in 
that case. Beyond that, however, it would also assist in ensuring that 
that future credit decisions appropriately factor into the analysis are-
alistic and prudent assessment of the debtor's financial prospects and 
the likelihood of insolvency. Furthermore, it would create rational 
incentives, even after the initial extension of value, for secured credi-
tors to monitor and thwart managerial decisions that eschew conven-
tional risk calculations in pursuit of short-term but low probability 
riches.210 In sum, if more credit is available, or available at a lower 
cost, simply because the providers of that credit have no motivation or 
reason to factor the true cost of credit into the lending decision, then 
it is far from clear to us that this is something the commercial law 
should embrace. Thus, the conventional arguments against diluting 
Article 9's full priority regime collapse under the weight of their own 
internal illogic, and the road is cleared to fashion a remedy suited to 
redress the "security interest as a nuisance" phenomenon as and when 
it occurs. 
CoNCLUSION 
The introduction of equity or equity-like notions into the Article 
9 priority scheme has been questioned as potentially undermining 
commercial certainty and efficiency.211 But, in the absence of mallea-
ble equitable controls, what are the constraints on secured credit? 
Thanks to the conceptual monopoly owned by Article 9, most espe-
cially in its revised version, the security interest is property for all ends, 
assuring the secured creditor property priority on a field of play where 
other claimants hold no interest dignified by that label. What is more, 
unlike other property interests, the security interest has come to oc-
cupy the elevated but questionable status of property endowed with 
immunity from conventional property misuse or abuse controls, most 
notably for our purposes, the nuisance doctrine.212 We challenge that 
tion is how the efficiency arguments, even if they were unambiguously true, stack up 
against other considerations [such as community sensibilities and fairness)."). 
210 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text for discussion of the perverse 
incentives created by the property-based account of security. 
211 SeejAMESj. WHITE & RoBERTS. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CooE § 24-19 
(4th ed. 1995) (entitled, "Weird Cases: The Creeping Infestation of Article 9 Priority 
Rules by 'Principles of Law and Equity' and other Cases on the Fringe of Title 9"). 
212 See supra Part IlL 
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immunity as irrational on the grounds of distributive inequity, as well 
as the systemic adverse impact it creates in the form of perverse incen-
tives simultaneously bearing on lender-imposed discipline and mana-
gerial accountability.213 
It is, we would contend, unreasonable, not to mention illogical, to 
maintain that the property regime that attends Article 9 should par-
take of some but not all of the principles of the conveyancing model 
that apply with respect to other forms of property transactions. Thus, 
assuming a security interest is understood metaphorically to convey an 
interest in property, ownership of that interest, like any other prop-
erty interest, does not carry with it the absolute and unfettered right 
to interfere with the legitimate interests of others. Borrowing from 
the source concept that has, for better or worse, dominated the Arti-
cle 9 revision process-namely, property law doctrine and analysis-it 
is our position that when the debtor has through security allowed or 
conspired (which is really of no moment) with creditors to permit 
management to ignore the normal risk calculations associated with 
investment decisions by shifting that risk to potential tort victims, 
small trade creditors, and arguably even current equity,2 14 some limi-
tation on the normal rules of prioritization are appropriate to abate 
the nuisance. The remedial underpinnings that form the basis for 
such limitations are analogically already extant in the prevailing doc-
trines of fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination, prop-
erly understood. When implicated, those concepts, which Article 9 
cannot rationally exist independent of or immune from, are remedied 
through transfer back of the misappropriated assets, in this context 
transfer back of all or some of the priority interest through 
subordination. 
But if secured creditors are compelled by the possibility of a sub-
sequent reordering of priority to factor now a risk premium into the 
cost of lending, will not the inevitable effect be to raise the cost of 
credit or limit the availability of credit to suboptimal levels? This, of 
213 The point is not theoretical-the impact of these incentives is real, measura-
ble, and, it would appear, growing. See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 17-18 (describing 
the effects of cheap and easy secured credit on distribution to unsecured creditors in 
bankmptcy). The risk is particularly acute in the case of firms operating on the preci-
pice of insolvency where secured lenders, knowing they are protected up to the value 
of their collateral, are less inclined to monitor and control unduly risky investment 
decisions, and managers, with nothing to lose, are encouraged to engage in just such 
activities. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
214 Most literature focuses on tort victims. See supra note 107. We do not. While 
tort claimants are the most sympathetic casualties of judgment proofing, they are, by 
far, not the only ones who suffer at the hands of a bankruptcy system that, for the 
most part, enforces state law priority rules. 
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course, is the traditional efficiency-based apology in favor of an un-
compromisingly strict full priority regime. What we (and before us, 
others) 215 have attempted to show is that argument begs the question 
because it is predicated on an unstated, but highly dubious, assump-
tion that more credit is always preferable to less. From that premise, it 
naturally follows that the lower the cost of credit the better as well, 
since this in turn ensures an abundance of credit. Without desiring to 
rehash the by now hackneyed efficiency debate,216 the more honest 
proponents of full priority do not contest that this rule promotes the 
externalization of cost, but rather maintain that those costs are justi-
fied by the corresponding benefits of secured credit and, accordingly, 
are optimal. That proposition, however, has yet to be proved. In the 
meantime, the point at present is simply that any rule that pennits 
lenders to ignore all of the reasonably foreseeable costs of doing busi-
ness cannot be defended simply on the basis that this lowers the cost 
of credit. 
Currently, through the conveyance model, the Article 9 security 
interest partakes only of the advantages associated with the legal cate-
gory "property." It does not partake of property limitations and re-
sponsibilities that apply with respect to at least some other fonns of 
property transactions. It certainly is not subject to any limitations on 
use. These conditions strike us as the perfect formula for the abuse of 
secured credit in the form of judgment-proofing, the perfect formula 
for creating a nuisance. 
In the end, our proposal to rectify that situation is, again, a rela-
tively modest one. The nuisance doctrine to regulate unreasonable 
uses of property, and the remedial doctrine, equitable subordination, 
are already in place. The nuisance concept offers a manageable set of 
standards by which abuse of secured credit may be identified and 
given a familiar name, and its deleterious effects may be uprooted 
through the adjustment of priority. 
215 Several subordination proponents have argued that affording full priority for 
security interests in bankruptcy leads to suboptimal, inefficient precautions against 
risk. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 82, at 1584 (concluding limited liability permits 
corporations to externalize risk, with the result that corporations engage in behavior 
that is inefficient); Warren, supra note 27, at 1387-88 ("The incursions on priority in 
tax law, in statutory liens, and in bankruptcy, make clear that fostering as much lend-
ing as possible is not the only goal of any commercial law system. The goal is always 
one of balance."); see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting 
Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1197, 1216-17 (2005) 
(critiquing contractualist theories of bankruptcy law as creating the risk of the same 
sorts of losses from maladjustment of claims as those that exist in a full priority se-
cured credit regime from the presence of maladjusting unsecured creditors). 
216 See supra note 7. 
